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INTRODUCTION 
 
The thesis aims to explore the connections between analyses of biopolitics and 
semiotics. The thesis comprises four original publications and the introductory 
part which serves as a theoretical and conceptual frame for the individual pub-
lications; as such, it is not simply a summary of the arguments made in the 
articles, but also an attempt to develop them and to provide some indication as 
to where future research on the topic could be guided.  
 The term “biopolitics” was first coined in the early twentieth century from 
the organicist perspective on state and nationhood by the Swedish political 
scientist Rudolf Kjellén (Esposito 2008: 16–17; Lemke 2011: 9–10). In this 
context, biology was understood to be a fundamental discipline for the manage-
ment of the state seen in terms of a form of life. Life acted as the foundation of 
politics. While organicism fell into disrepute with its genocidal application by 
Nazi politics and was challenged by the development of genetics, the perspec-
tive that biological modeling of behavior should be applied to the analysis of 
political action is still seen as relevant today (e.g., Hatemi and McDermott 
2011). 
 The thesis adopts a different perspective and positions itself into the critical 
tradition of the analysis of biopolitics that was proposed in the 1970s by Michel 
Foucault. He defined biopolitics as “the set of mechanisms through which the 
basic biological features of the human species became the object of a political 
strategy” (Foucault 2009: 1),1 and his aim was to understand the governmental 
logic according to which human biological life is employed in politics and 
embedded within power relations. The life-as-basis-of-politics perspective here 
becomes an object of research. 
 Foucaultʼs definition of and approach to biopolitics serves as a constant 
reference point to anyone who does critical analysis of the discourses and 
mechanisms that articulate lifeʼs connections to politics. The concept has, in the 
twenty-first century, markedly increased in popularity and it is widely used 
across disciplines in the humanities and social sciences – to the point that it is 
exposed to the danger of losing its specificity and becoming a “buzzword” 
(Lemke 2011: 1). As such, the concept of biopolitics signifies any and all 
appearance of (biological) life in a political context. It is not surprising, then, 
that the notion is understood to be losing its analytic value (Campbell 2011: 
vii). It is thus relevant to go back to Foucaultʼs original proposals on biopolitics 
and biopower in order to delimit the concept in a fruitful manner. 
 The proliferation of the uses of “biopolitics” has no doubt to do with the 
development of biotechnologies that have the potentiality to intervene in and 
transform the “natural” processes of life. The approach adopted here, however, 
                                                     
1  Another, similar, definition of biopolitics by Foucault goes as follows: “the attempt, 
starting from the eighteenth century, to rationalize the problems posed to governmental prac-
tice by phenomena characteristic of a set of living beings forming a population: health, hy-
giene, birthrate, life expectancy, race ...” (2008: 317). 
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does not, first and foremost, underscore the technological aspects of biopolitics. 
On the foreground here are rather the semiotic mechanisms through which the 
connections between life and politics are articulated. Now, while Foucaultʼs 
approach to power as immanent to social relations has been largely influential in 
the development of semiotics of power (Selg and Ventsel 2008) and, more 
generally, to the cultural turn in social sciences (Nash 2001), especially since it 
stresses the freedom and active participation of the subject in mechanisms of 
power, a participation through which the individual is constituted as a social 
subject, the concept of biopolitics has not gained much attention in the context 
of semiotics. This might be due to the presupposition that biopolitics somehow 
takes immediate control of life, without any semiotic mediation. In this scena-
rio, biopolitics would signify the direct intervention in the processes of life via 
technology or sovereign violence. Quite a few thinkers have the tendency to 
forego the dimension of freedom in the context of biopolitics that is often 
viewed as reducing human beings to a state of mere animality and survival. 
Such is the view of Hannah Arendt (1998[1958]) and Giorgio Agamben (1998) 
with whom the Foucauldian understanding of biopolitics is, in this thesis, put 
into critical dialogue.  
 In order to argue for the semiotic aspects in Foucaultʼs approach to bio-
politics, it is necessary to position the latter into the more general framework of 
his conceptualization of power. In this way, it is possible to show that bio-
politics also operates primarily through subjectification – that is, through 
making possible certain delimited ways of being in a society thus enabling 
individuals to constitute themselves as social subjects. The main proposal put 
forth in the thesis is that biopolitics is subjectification, that is, the delimitation 
and possibilization of ways of subjectivation.2 This does not signify individualsʼ 
direct subjection to power, but always entails semiotic mediation. Foucaultʼs 
general approach to power relations is the focus of the first chapter.  
 The second chapter shall move on specifically to biopolitics seen from the 
perspective of subjectification that is conceptualized in terms of normalization 
taking place in dispositives of power. Employing Foucaultʼs concept of the 
dispositive – a network of heterogeneous elements deployed to some strategic 
ends (Foucault 1980b: 194–195) – enables us to treat normalization not as a 
simple process of objectification of individualsʼ lives, but rather to stress that 
normalization entails the structuration of semiotic relations within the social 
milieu. Here, it becomes fruitful to think of the dispositive in terms of the social 
umwelt in order to highlight the subjective dimension at work in biopolitical 
normalization. In turn, thinking of Jakob von Uexküllʼs (1926; 1957[1934]; 
1982[1940]) concept of umwelt from the biopolitical perspective enables us to 
decenter the subject as the source of all meaning. Instead, strategies and 
                                                     
2  The process of subjectification refers to the ways in which subjects are made knowable 
and controllable, that is, normalized, while subjectivation refers to the modes through which 
these objectivations are put to use in the construction of social subjectivity by human beings 
turning themselves into subjects. 
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discourses of power have an integral part to play in the construction of human 
subjective universes. Viewed through this lens, normalization does not appear 
as direct intervention into life, but as prescription on subjective normativity, to 
use Georges Canguilhemʼs terms. 
 The third chapter provides a discussion on subjectivity and freedom in the 
context of biopolitics and steps into dialogue with Hannah Arendt and Giorgio 
Agamben, both of whom understand biopolitics as the reduction of human 
beings to a less-than-human condition and of human lives to a state of mere 
survival. The chapter argues that adopting a Foucauldian perspective does not 
necessitate that the analysis of biopolitics should be done in terms of reduction, 
but rather of subjectification. While Arendtʼs and Agambenʼs conceptualization 
is totalizing in its view of biopolitics as a nearly all-encompassing event of 
modernity, Foucaultʼs view of specific strategies of power in dispositives 
enables us to stress the importance of resistance and agency in the context of 
power relations. Resistance is a constitutive dimension of power relations and is 
not to be thought as an escape from power. It is hoped that with the first three 
chapters the view of biopolitics as a strategy of power operating through semio-
tic means and thus allowing for a dimension of freedom and agency is suffi-
ciently argued for.  
 The fourth and final chapter of the introductory part of the thesis shall then 
present a problematization of two biosemiotic concepts – namely, the semiotic 
threshold and umwelt – from the perspective of biopolitical critique. This is 
done in order to demonstrate the ambiguous nature of the models from the life 
sciences – of which biosemiotics purports itself to be the redefining discipline – 
when applied to the conceptualization of politics. These ambiguities should 
remind us of the dangers of using biological metaphors in order to understand 
politics. 
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1. POWER AND SUBJECTIVITY:  
THE SOCIAL SEMIOTICS OF  
MICHEL FOUCAULT 
 
Michel Foucault has been described by Gilles Deleuze as a “seismic” thinker, or 
in other words, one that proceeds “by crises or quakes” (2006: 338). These 
ruptures in Foucaultʼs work are evident: in the 1960s he analyzed the discursive 
formation of knowledge, from the mid-1970s onwards he concentrated on the 
dispositives of power, and from the start of the 1980s until his death in 1984 he 
thought how a history of subjectivity – or ethics – could be conceptualized. The 
disruptions, however, are perhaps not so strong as they might seem at first 
glance: the workings of power are evident in the knowledge of mental illness as 
analyzed in The History of Madness (2006a [1961]), just as the notion of 
subjectivity is present in the analysis of the dispositive of sexuality in the first 
volume of The History of Sexuality (1978). Indeed, looking back on his work at 
the beginning of the 1980s, Foucault stated that its running thread had been that 
of the subject: “My objective [...] has been to create a history of different modes 
by which, in our culture, human beings are made subjects” (1982: 777). Posed 
in this way, it is clear that the subject cannot be thought outside neither know-
ledge nor power; instead, the subject is always constructed within the context of 
power/knowledge. Put differently, there can be no pure philosophy of the 
subject. 
 The aim of this chapter is to draw out the semiotic implications of Foucaultʼs 
understanding of power and power relations and examine how the notion of the 
subject might be conceptualized in their context. Since the interest of this thesis 
is to conceptualize the way in which biopolitical subjectivity is constructed, it is 
first necessary to understand from which perspective subjectivity is under- 
stood – a semiotically informed Foucauldian approach serves here as a starting 
point. 
 Although Foucault relates himself to semiotics only through the semiological 
and structuralist tradition, and thus understands it as the study of “the structure 
of communication” (1980a: 114) or “relations of signification” as separate from 
power relations (1982: 778), it is without doubt that a large part of his social 
analysis deals exactly with the creation of possibilities of and constraints on 
meaning-making. It is perhaps simply a case of the semiotic threshold, a 
question of which relations and phenomena to understand as participating in 
semiosis. It is my view that when Foucault speaks of power relations, we can 
interpret them as semiotic relations by focusing on the subjectifying aspect of 
power. A relation of power can thus be conceptualized as impelling a certain 
type of self-description, that is, as a prescription on how an individual should 
transform him or herself into a social subject. In short, a relation of power does 
not have immediate, unmediated and automatic effects, but it opens up a 
possible field for subjectivation. 
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1.1. The power of truth: power in discourse 
Let us firstly consider the most clear and obvious link that Michel Foucault has 
with semiotics, namely his understanding of discourse and the mechanisms of 
power immanent to discourse.3 While the notion of power was not explicitly 
conceptualized in Foucaultʼs work before the 1970s, his earlier work on the 
formations of knowledge in Western society always in some way or other 
already implicated power as operative within the construction of knowledge. 
History of Madness (2006a), first published in 1961, for example, dealt with the 
problem of how knowledge of mental illness formed in the nineteenth century 
enabled the internment and exclusion of certain kinds of people from the 
“normal” people endowed with healthy rationality. This was further examined 
in the 1973–74 and 1974–75 lecture courses held at the Collège de France, 
entitled Psychiatric Power (2006b) and Abnormal (2003b). 
 One of the underlying themes that tie knowledge to power is that of the 
constitution of subjectivity, that is, of making possible certain ways of being in 
a given society through formations of knowledge. Thus, the 1963 book The 
Birth of the Clinic (2003) examines the role of medical perception in the consti-
tution of the human being as a finite subject, a topic expanded upon and revised 
in The Order of Things (2002) three years later. In the latter, Foucault studies 
how the modern formation of knowledge – episteme – constitutes “Man” as an 
empirico-transcendental doublet. It is thus the semiotic system of knowledge 
which makes possible ways of being in a society.4 
 One might ask, however, why is the definition of ways of being necessarily 
connected to power. One of the principal discursive operators of power is 
identified by Foucault as “the will to truth” (1972: 218), or in other words, how 
a discursive field within which true and false statements are recognizable is 
constituted. Furthermore, “a whole teratology of learning” (ibid., 223) is created 
which is not recognized within this discursive field as neither true nor false – it 
remains simply meaningless, without value. If we follow Foucaultʼs under-
standing that the formation of knowledge dominant in a society constitutes pos-
sible ways of being within that society, then we can certainly agree that the 
“political question [...] is not error, illusion, alienated consciousness or ideo-
logy; it is truth itself” (Foucault 1980a: 133).5 Each society has its own “regime 
of truth” that prescribes the ways in which and by whom truth can be uttered 
(ibid., 131). Truth is immanent to the system of knowledge of a society. What 
statements can be recognized as having a truth value, about what and whom can 
truth be uttered, and who can be recognized as the speaker of truth are outcomes 
                                                     
3  Foucaultʼs influences can clearly be sensed in Selg and Ventselʼs (2008; 2010) approach 
to semiotics of power in which they conceptualize power as operating through discourse. 
4  It is worth mentioning that Lotman and Uspensky refer to The Order of Things regarding 
the typology of culture by stressing how Foucault examines “the connection between 
cultural evolution and the change in relation to the sign” (1978: 230).  
5  On the relations of Foucault to the Frankfurt Schoolʼs analyses of ideology, deception, 
alienation, see McCarthy (1990).  
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of the construction of knowledge.6 Truth is thus not a matter of correspondence 
between propositions and the world – a statement can be said to be true or false 
only within the historical and contingent complex of power/knowledge.7 
 Consequently, the question becomes, how must one construct oneself as a 
social subject in order to become a “true” subject, one that constructs itself 
according to those knowledges that speak the truth of subjectivity and through 
which one is able to express truth about him or herself.8 In a regime of truth, 
individualsʼ choices of how to construct oneself as a social subject are de-
limited, they are impelled to adopt a certain kind of self-description (such as 
psychiatric, psychological, economic, etc.). The power of truth, then, is to be 
viewed positively as that which prescribes possible ways of being, makes it 
possible for an individual to subjectivize oneself, but that at the same time 
delimits and defines the possibilities of self-construction. 
 Discursive knowledge does not, consequently, have a merely epistemolo-
gical dimension. Instead, one might say that discourses construct the very social 
reality that individuals inhabit as subjects. That is, knowledge works also – and 
perhaps more importantly – on the ontological level, constituting reality and the 
beings inhabiting it. This ontology cannot, of course, be the metaphysical theory 
that understands being as a (stable) ground from which beings can emerge. 
Foucault speaks rather of “historical ontology” (1984a: 45–46; 1984b: 351), of 
the way that subjectivities and societies are historically constructed. It is in this 
context that Foucault can state in The Order of Things that “[b]efore the end of 
the eighteenth century, man did not exist” (2002: 336). This does not mean 
anything as absurd as “human beings did not exist,” but that the figure of the 
human being familiar to us was historically constructed within the framework of 
the human sciences. The human being as both a subject and an object to itself – 
the empirico-transcendental doublet – is a historical being. This, however, does 
not make “man” any less real, does not make this figure into an ideological 
illusion, but instead constitutes a prism through which the truth of human beings 
can be uttered. 
 While Foucault did not elaborate the theme of historical ontology in any 
greater depth other than to suggest that his work on knowledge, power, and 
                                                     
6  As Paul Veyne says, “one can only speak truly by virtue of the force of the rules imposed 
at one time or another by a history whose individuals are at once, and mutually, actors and 
victims. Thus by truths we do not mean true propositions to be discovered or accepted but 
the set of rules that make it possible to utter and to recognize those propositions held as true” 
(1993: 3). 
7  In Richard Rortyʼs terms we can say that the truth is not “out there” but instead is 
constructed in our descriptions of the world: “The world is out there, but descriptions of the 
world are not. Only descriptions of the world can be true or false. The world on its own – 
unaided by the describing activities of human beings – cannot” (1989: 5).  
8  This is the problem of the first volume of The History of Sexuality (Foucault 1978): not 
that sex was used to repress, but that a certain discourse of desire and confession was formed 
that claimed to speak the very truth of subjectivity. Sexuality was constructed as that through 
which one could understand the subject. 
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ethics could be read in the vein of “a historical ontology of ourselves”,9 the 
theme of ontology is taken up by Ian Hacking who says that “we are concerned, 
in the end, with possible ways to be a person” (2002: 2). Hacking sees the 
problem of “making up people” through naming and categorization as onto-
logical questions that construct general kinds to which individuals have to 
respond in one way or another; by identification or rejection – but if a category 
has been institutionalized and rendered “true”, then it cannot be simply ignored. 
For example, since the nineteenth century, one has the possibility, but also 
sometimes the demand to adopt the descriptor of “pervert”, while before no 
such possibility – no matter how perversely one behaved – existed (see also 
Davidson 1987). This is the ontological aspect at play here: each discursive 
formation constructs its own object of knowledge (Foucault 1972: ch. 3), and 
when the object of knowledge is a certain aspect of the human being, the know-
ledge of this object becomes a prescription for subjectivation. As much as 
knowledge is historical, so are also the subjects and objects that know and are 
known.10 
 The dynamic between naming, categorization, labeling and subjectivation 
according to those categories, names, labels that carry with them certain know-
ledges is called by Hacking “dynamic nominalism”. Where classical nomina-
lism holds that it is solely our given names that create classes of beings in the 
world, dynamic nominalism holds that a certain response from those named is 
necessary. Only with a self-descriptive response from individuals according to 
invented categories is it possible to state that “a kind of person” comes “into 
being at the same time as the kind itself” is invented (Hacking 2002: 106). Of 
course, not all objects created by and in knowledge are capable of response, 
only those – namely, humans – who are capable of speaking the same language 
as that knowledge. For example, we cannot state that our knowledge of germs 
creates them; our description does not affect them in the least bit, only when 
other (technical) measures of action are taken in accordance with our 
descriptions, does our knowledge begin to affect the behavior of germs. When 
categories of people are invented, however, new “possibilities for personhood” 
are simultaneously constructed (ibid., 110). 
 The power operating through and within a regime of truth should be under-
stood exactly in terms of possibilization, a simultaneous opening up and 
delimiting, and thus not in terms of simple restriction and one-way determi-
nation. This is exactly the positivity of power in discourse: it prescribes possible 
fields of choices. On the one hand, individuals are rendered manageable and 
governable as objects of knowledge (the process of subjectification), but on the 
                                                     
9  “Three domains of genealogy are possible. First, a historical ontology of ourselves in 
relation to truth through which we constitute ourselves as subjects of knowledge; second, a 
historical ontology of ourselves in relation to a field of power through which we constitute 
ourselves as subjects acting on others; third, a historical ontology in relation to ethics 
through which we constitute ourselves as moral agents” (Foucault 1984b: 351). 
10  On this point see also Annemarie Molʼs discussion of “ontological politics”, albeit from 
the perspective of actor network theory (1999). 
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other hand, individuals are constantly transforming themselves into subjects 
(the process of subjectivation) by (re)interpreting, reimagining the prescribed 
ways of being in the world. We can then speak of a constant process of sub-
jectivation within the context of the complex of power/knowledge, but not of a 
fixed and determined subject. 
 When Alan Schrift writes that “Foucault left to us the task of thinking a 
notion of a subject that is both autonomous and disciplined, both actively self-
forming and passively self-constructed [...]” (1997: 156), he is to my mind 
correct in not choosing between the two alternatives, since this would amount to 
reducing Foucaultʼs thought either to a philosophy of agency as opposed to 
power or to a reflection of subjective helplessness in the face of an almighty 
power. As will become clear shortly, when we now turn to Foucaultʼs explicit 
conceptualization of power relations, subjectivity should indeed be thought 
within this ambiguity of self-construction and constitution from without, of 
subjectivation and subjectification. And this ambiguity inherent in Foucaultʼs 
analysis of power relations leads us to conclude, in the end, that Foucaultʼs 
notion of subjectivity is extremely close to that of a semiotic subjectivity as a 
constant process and dynamic of internalization and externalization. 
 
 
1.2. Relations of power and subjectivity 
Moving on from discourse and discursive formations to relations of power, we 
are confronted with the following statement that makes it rather difficult to 
conceptualize Foucaultʼs understanding of power in semiotic terms: “The 
history which bears and determines us has the form of a war rather than that of 
language: relations of power, not relations of meaning” (Foucault 1980a: 114). 
He seems to exclude power from meaning and meaning from power.  
 However, we need to remember, firstly, that when Foucault separates both 
the study of “the structure of communication” (ibid.) and of “relations of signi-
fication” (1982: 778) from the study of power relations, he does this on the 
background of Saussurean semiology, the dominant school of semiotics in France 
at that time, which sought, in its analyses of society, to reconstruct an underlying 
differential structure of meaning – on the basis of linguistic models – based on 
which it would be possible to describe the emergence of individual social facts. 
Foucault, however, already in his conceptualization of discursive formations in 
The Archaeology of Knowledge, sought to overcome the distinction of a 
transcendental langue from an empirical parole11 by stating that the rules 
ordering the dispersion of statements are not separable from the utterance of 
statements. Rules are immanent to the statements. And when it is understood 
that the rules are immanent to the practice of discourse – to utterances about the 
world – we need to account for the non-discursive relations at play, such as 
disciplinary norms, institutional constraints, economic factors, etc. (Foucault 
                                                     
11  On this distinction see Saussure (2011[1916]); Barthes (1977[1964]). 
16 
1972: 45). Foucault sought to analyze discourse as practice12 through which the 
very conditions of what is sayable and of what nothing cannot be said are 
established (ibid., 46).13 It is necessary to take account of the social relations, 
norms, institutions, etc. within, through, and according to which discourse is 
practiced. Thus, when Foucault distances himself from structural semiology, 
perhaps unbeknownst to him, he moves closer to a constructivist sociosemiotics 
which deals exactly with the constitution of social reality as interactive and 
significational practice (in the vein of, for example, Berger and Luckmann 
1991[1966]; Randviir 2004). 
 Secondly, when we read on, it becomes clear on which terms Foucault sepa-
rates power from meaning in history. He states: “History has no ʻmeaningʼ, 
though this is not to say that it is absurd or incoherent” (1980a: 114). In this 
statement, Foucaultʼs approach to history is evidently Nietzschean in that he 
denies any kind of transcendental, ahistorical, and totalizing meaning to the 
progress of historical events, and instead holds that the meaning inscribed to 
history and within history is itself historical, a result of historical interpreta-
tions.14 This stance is furthermore expressed in Foucaultʼs methodological 
choice in approaching social phenomena as historical, namely that of genealogy. 
The task of the genealogist is not to constitute the ultimate meaning, to discover 
the origin, but to uncover the mechanisms that are hidden by the apparently 
final, closed meaning of a phenomenon or an event. Genealogy is “to identify 
the accidents, the minute deviations – or conversely, the complete reversals – 
the errors, the false appraisals, and the faulty calculations that gave birth to 
those things which continue to exist and have value for us; it is to discover that 
truth or being lies not at the root of what we know and what we are but the 
exteriority of accidents” (Foucault 2000b: 374). In other words, doing 
genealogy means to identify those contingencies behind the construction of 
phenomena that we now take for granted. It is to transform seeming necessities 
into contingent events, which is why Foucault has also used here the term 
                                                     
12  Félix Guattari underlines this aspect in Foucaultʼs analysis of discourse through the 
notion of statement which, “for Foucault, no longer functions on the authority of a segment 
of a universal logos leveling out existential contingencies. Its proper domain is therefore no 
longer simply that of a relation of signification, articulating the relationship between signi-
fier and signified, nor of the relation of the denotation of a referent. For it is also a capacity 
of existential production [...]. In its mode of being singular, the Foucauldian statement is 
neither quite linguistic, nor exclusively material” (Guattari 1996: 178, original italics). 
13  This is not to deny that Foucaultʼs earlier work – such as The Birth of the Clinic and The 
Order of Things – sought precisely to bring out the systematicity and structure of knowledge. 
However, when moving away from the archaeological method (and already The Archaeo-
logy of Knowledge can be seen as a farewell to archaeology) and towards genealogy, it 
becomes clear that discursive formations are not to be thought as structures standing apart or 
above practice. 
14  There “is nothing absolutely primary to interpret, for after all everything is already 
interpretation, each sign is in itself not the thing that offers itself to interpretation but an 
interpretation of other signs” (Foucault 2000a: 275). On the role of Nietzsche in Foucaultʼs 
genealogical method see also Mahon (1992). 
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“eventalization” that refers to the rediscovery of the “connections, encounters, 
supports, blockages, plays of forces, strategies, and so on that at a given 
moment establish what subsequently comes to count as being self-evident, 
universal and necessary” (cited in Olssen 1999: 62). It can be said that here, too, 
in the rejection of the “meaning of history” and in the method of genealogy, 
Foucault radiates social constructivist tones in that he rejects social-historical 
phenomena as self-evident and self-explanatory, but instead in need of de-
construction. 
 Thus, if we look at Foucaultʼs separation between meaning and power, struc-
tures of communication and power relations from the perspective of socio-
semiotics, we discover that there is, in fact, no basis for this distinction, at least 
in so far as Foucault understands power as constituting possible trajectories for 
subjectivation. This becomes evident in his treatment of power relations as 
immanent in the social network: “Relations of power are not in a position of 
exteriority with respect to other types of relationships (economic processes, 
knowledge relationships, sexual relations), but are immanent in the latter; they 
are the immediate effects of the divisions, inequalities, and disequilibriums 
which occur in the latter” (Foucault 1978: 94). Here Foucault also acknow-
ledges that power relations cannot be separated from relations, patterns, and 
structures of communication (be they economic, familial, sexual, etc.).15 When 
power is understood as immanent to social relations it is easy to understand 
what exactly is meant by the productive nature of power: it is not something 
that prohibits from without or from above, but that, through inequalities inhe-
rent in social relations, constitutes positions in social relations from which 
individuals may act and within which they can assume the role of the speaker, 
that is, an author of uttered statements.16 And this is why it is also necessary to 
stress that “power comes from below” (ibid.) – relations of power are constantly 
(re)produced in social interaction, in everyday praxis. 
 It is here that power relations can be said to be constitutive in the full sense 
of the word: individuals are able to transform themselves into social subjects 
within the social field crossed by power relations. In this sense, power relations 
are constitutive of subjects. Whether it is a domain of knowledge or a social 
institution (e.g., a family, a school, etc.), a certain type of subjectivity is re-
quired in order for one to acquire the right to speak or the position to act. An 
individual must construct oneself in a certain way in order to participate in 
social interaction. Thus a history of subjectivity according to different networks 
of relations becomes possible. In the beginning of the 1980s, Foucault stated 
that, indeed, the primary objective of his work has not been neither knowledge 
                                                     
15  Directly connected to this realization that power is immanent to social relations is the 
cultural turn in social theory that stresses the importance of meaning and communication in 
the analysis of power, which is seen as operating through the production of signification as 
well as the structures of institutions and hierarchies in society (see Nash 2001). 
16  Foucault is thus directly opposed to the liberal view of power according to which the 
individual stands opposed to power and the latter simply restricts his or her actions or makes 
him or her behave in a way that s/he otherwise would not (see Selg and Ventsel 2008: 172). 
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nor power, but “to create a history of different modes by which, in our culture, 
human beings are made subjects” (1982: 777). Although Foucault differentiates 
the technologies of the self (or the ways in which an individual transforms him 
or herself into a subject) from the technologies of production, of sign systems, 
and of power (1988: 18), it is important to understand that they do not operate 
in isolation from each other, but should, again, be understood as coexistent and 
complementary. Technologies of the self cannot be conceived without techno-
logies of power and knowledge since the former necessarily make use of the 
discourses that (at least claim to) speak the truth of subjectivity, express the 
truth of what it means to construct oneself as a self: “Truth is above all a system 
of obligations” (Foucault 2017: 12). However, with the notion of technologies 
of the self, Foucault directs us to the ambiguity already noted in the constitution 
of social subjectivity, namely that we have to take into account both active 
subjectivation and techniques of subjectification in the constitution of sub-
jectivity. There can be no total and final liberation from government, just as 
there cannot be a total control of the subject. This ambiguity, a dynamic of 
government and freedom, is noted by Foucault in “The Subject and Power” in 
which he writes:  
 
[W]hat defines a relationship of power is that it is a mode of action which does 
not act directly and immediately on others. Instead, it acts upon their actions: 
an action upon an action, on existing actions or on those which may arise in the 
present or the future. [...] a power relationship can only be articulated on the 
basis of two elements which are each indispensable if it is really to be a power 
relationship: that “the other” [...] be thoroughly recognized and maintained to 
the very end as a person who acts; and that, faced with a relationship of power, 
a whole field of responses, reactions, results and possible inventions may open 
up. (1982: 789) 
 
A relation of power thus entails, at least to a certain degree, freedom, a possi-
bility of reaction and a delimitation of responses; a simultaneous possibilization 
and limitation. Freedom is not here to be thought in the sense of an inherent 
capacity of the subject as that who would, by its nature, resist power, but in the 
context of a specific network of power relations that does not determine all 
possible routes of action. A relation of power presupposes the possibility of 
choice. And this is exactly how Foucault understands the general notion of 
government, as the structuration of “the possible field of action of others” (ibid., 
790). Government is an activity of structuration and not necessarily of repres-
sion.17 Government is the putting into play of a network of power relations 
within which an individual can render itself into a social subject. 
                                                     
17  Nikolas Rose (1999) has spoken in this context of how power, in fact, produces freedom. 
Of course, the freedom produced by power is delimited to “proper” behavior and “reason-
able” choices, etc., but nevertheless we should take into account that power and freedom are 
not contradictory, but instead, the former can operate through the latter (see also Lemke 
2012). 
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 A history, or a genealogy of the subject can thus be written from the perspec-
tive of the complex of power/knowledge while not assuming that the subject is 
simply rendered into a passive object to be acted upon. If one does not take the 
subject as something pre-existing the social field of relations, but instead as 
something constituted within it, we do not have to assume the inherently violent 
and abusive nature of power. To govern means to conduct the conduct of 
individuals, that is, to shape the way in which their self-construction is con-
ducted. Power, while being immanent to social relations, institutions, structures, 
is always at the same time mediated by those relations, institutions, structures 
that are, at their core, constructing social reality as meaningful reality – a 
semiotic reality. Thus it is not contradictory to state that the subjectivity Fou-
cault is talking about is very close to semiotic subjectivity in the case of George 
Herbert Mead who understands the construction of the self similarly in a rela-
tional manner, as the constant internalization of social relations and projection 
of expectations to the social field (1925). To speak in Meadʼs terms, the 
construction of the social self means to render oneself into an object (“me”) to 
oneself (1913) in the same terms as those according to which truthful know-
ledge of individuals is constructed. That is, a “self” in Meadʼs terms or a “sub-
ject” in Foucaultʼs cannot be conceived apart from social relations to which 
power is an immanent and constitutive factor. 
 The Foucauldian view on subjectivity and government presumes that the 
governed subjects construct themselves in a way that would render them 
governable. Or in Hackingʼs terms, that individuals would respond to the cate-
gories invented to label people in such a way as to verify the reality of those 
categories. The construction of subjectivity is thus a semiotic process of self-
government, of self-description according to an invented or socially constructed 
reality, and thus it is compatible with Juri Lotmanʼs realization that the self is a 
continuous auto-communicative process (1990).  
 Thus, in analyzing the government of individuals, the self-description of 
individuals within the network of power is as important as the mechanisms of 
power used to govern as it reveals the process of social subjectivation in the 
context of government and power relations and how ways of being in society 
are (re)produced. The main takeaway is to understand subjectivity as const-
ructed in communication and meaning-making practices. Semiotics does not, in 
any way, understand the construction of subjectivity as isolated from power and 
knowledge but instead sees the subject as dependent on cultural codes, social 
norms, social interactions, etc. Both the Foucauldian and the semiotic perspec-
tive on subjectivity sees it not as a starting point, and origin of meaning, but 
instead as a problem: how is the (individual or collective) subject18 constructed 
                                                     
18  The notion of the subject should not be limited strictly to individual human beings. A 
collective (e.g., a population, a nation, a subculture, etc.) can as well be thought as a trans-
individual subject. We should instead employ the concept of the semiotic subject. According 
to Randviir, “Semiotic subjects can be understood as semiotically bordered (semiotically 
distinct) and semiotically active physical organisms or conditionally distinct organisms” 
(2007: 143). The boundaries of the subject are not drawn physically, but on the basis of (to a 
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One has to dispense with the constituent subject, to get rid of the subject itself, 
thatʼs to say, to arrive at an analysis which can account for the constitution of 
the subject within a historical framework. And this is what I would call genea-
logy, that is, a form of history which can account for the constitution of know-
ledges, discourses, domains of objects etc., without having to make reference 
to a subject which is either transcendental in relation to the field of events or 
runs in its empty sameness throughout the course of history. (1980a: 117) 
 
Applying abstract semiotic models to Foucaultʼs analyses of the construction 
and constitution of subjectivity, we need to, first and foremost, answer the 
question, what do these models represent – do they present to us a fixed form of 
the subject or do they allow us to consider the general capacity for subjecti-
vation? My interpretation tends to choose for the latter perspective. Since 
semiotics deals with subjectivity always in the context of a specific society, 
culture, or environment,19 it cannot pose anything like a “founding subject”20 
standing outside and apart from its sociocultural context. This understanding is 
stressed by Lotman who states that individuality “is not primary or self-evident 
but depends on the means of encoding” (1990: 234). Similarly to Foucault, then, 
Lotman treats the subject as an outcome of social interaction and as constructed 
                                                                                                                                  
certain extent) unified patterns of meaning-making. In this sense, the individual organism is 
always already a multiplicity – a product of unification of varying semiotic processes. 
19  Already from William James (1890) and George Herbert Mead (1913; 1925; 1972 
[1934]) onwards, the “self” is always a social self and cannot be thought in terms of the indi-
vidual opposing society (see also Wiley 1994). 
20  In his inaugural lecture at the Collège de France in 1970, Foucault analyzed the notion of 
the “founding subject” as one of the ways in which the reality of discourse is elided: “The 
task of the founding subject is to animate the empty forms of language with his objectives; 
through the thickness and inertia of empty things, he grasps intuitively the meanings lying 
within them” (1972: 227). The founding subject, then, is someone capable of giving 
meaning, while not himself being subject to the effects of meaning-making. 
in a culture, in a society, and through politics? It is more pertinent, then, to 
speak of the process of subjectivation than of the subject – the latter is always 
the result or, better, the temporarily fixed point of a process of ongoing 
construction. 
 There is, however, an important discrepancy between a Foucauldian and a 
semiotic approach to conceptualizing the subject. While Foucault theorizes 
subjectivity from a genealogical perspective and asks how the subject is histo-
rically constructed in the context of power and knowledge, a semiotic theory of 
subjectivity instead attempts to provide abstract models to analyze the semiotic 
logic of subjectivation. It would seem, then, that by employing semiotic theories 
of subjectivity – or in other words, the self – as applicable to Foucaultʼs 
historical analyses we are in danger of reducing Foucault to what he was trying 
to escape, namely, to a philosophy of subjectivity. Are not semiotic models of 
subjectivity contravening the following demand voiced by Foucault? 
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through sociocultural codes: “a personality may be thought of as an individual 
set of socially significant codes” (Lotman 1990: 22).  
 Consequently, semiotic models of subjectivity are not to be seen as contra-
dictory to Foucaultʼs genealogy, but instead as complementary to it. In what 
sense exactly? They enable us to trace the semiotic logic of historical construc-
tions of the subject. For example, in the article “Surviving Finitude: Survival as 
a Constructed Foundation of Identity” (publication III), Lotmanʼs notion of 
auto-communication was used to trace the semiotic logic behind the con-
struction of the Estonian nation as a subject turned towards death, as a semiotic 
subject that is founded upon the constructed drive to persist in its sameness. 
Analyzing this socioculturally constructed need for survival based on auto-
communicational mechanisms enabled us, in addition to its historically specific 
outlines, to draw out its semiotic mechanism which consisted in the constant 
reiteration of the need for survival of the Estonian nation and not primarily in 
any positive constructions of identity. Security of life dominated over the 
construction of culture. In this type of identity construction, auto-commu-
nicational repetition of messages seen as crucial for the persistence of the 
collective self dominates over the communication with the (social, cultural, 
political) other, and thus the process of self-formation tends to become enclosed 
and potentially hostile to otherness. Such public discourse of national identity 
acts as one possible trajectory for the social subjectivation of individuals, as a 
possible way to become “Estonian” – if not the “true” way of becoming an 
“Estonian”. In short, the Foucauldian approach to trace the ways in which social 
subject positions are made possible in public discourse was complemented with 
an analysis based on Lotmanʼs model of auto-communicational self-con-
struction, the latter providing the possibility to elaborate the structural logic of 
meaning making.  
 Lotmanʼs model of auto-communication thus does not present us with a 
ready-made subjectivity, but simply underlines the semiotic capacity for sub-
jectivation that in specific historical situations is always realized in different 
ways. While Foucaultʼs approach enables us to stress the historicity of any kind 
of subjectivation, Lotmanʼs modeling of subjectivity helps us to see which 
semiotic mechanisms and communicational channels are employed. 
 
*** 
 
Moving forward in the next chapter to the conceptualization of biopolitics, we 
will have to keep in mind what has been stated above. Namely, that power, for 
Foucault, is not describable neither as violence nor in terms of causal relations 
necessitating certain actions. In order to draw out the semiotic aspects of bio-
politics, it will have to be conceptualized in terms of the processes of subjecti-
vation and subjectification. The question we will have to answer in the next 
chapter is, consequently, what type of subjects does biopolitics make possible? 
What are the constraints on social subjectivity set by biopolitics? In order to 
answer these questions, let us turn to Foucaultʼs concept of dispositive.  
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2. BIOPOLITICAL DISPOSITIVES 
 
The aim of this chapter is to provide a semiotic conceptualization of biopolitics. 
The main concept used to attain this goal is that of the dispositive. When Fou-
cault shifted his focus from formations of knowledge to power (relations), he 
began using the concept of dispositive instead of discourse or discursive 
formation since the former comprises not only the relations between linguistic 
statements, but also the material, spatial, visible elements and their relations 
with what is sayable. Dispositive enables him to analyze the ordering of social 
fields in which individuals act and behave. In dispositives,21 knowledge is put to 
work and its circulation made possible. 
 The article “Why Does ʻNormalizationʼ Matter to Political Semiotics?” 
(publication II) proposes that biopolitical dispositives are characterizable as 
those which have a fundamentally normalizing function. This proposal follows 
from Foucaultʼs analysis of the dispositive of security22 within which the 
population emerged as a biopolitical subject-object (2009). In the context of the 
dispositive of security, Foucault speaks of a specific type of normalization 
distinct from the normative aspects of both sovereign power and disciplinary 
power. The type of normalization characteristic of the dispositive of security 
attempts to detect and discover the normal and deduce the norm from “an 
interplay of differential normalities” (Foucault 2009: 63). The population as a 
subject-object of biopolitics emerges as a natural phenomenon with its intrinsic 
norms that government will have to take into account. 
 The chapter will firstly and very briefly attempt to summarize what Foucault 
meant when he spoke of biopolitics. Secondly, it will turn to the notion of 
dispositive in the context of biopolitics and elaborate on its specifically semiotic 
aspects – most importantly, in connection with Jakob von Uexküllʼs concept 
umwelt. Next, the interplay between normalization and normativity is con-
sidered as crucial for understanding the biopolitical context. Georges Can-
guilhemʼs thought is employed in order to conceptualize the figure of life 
present in Foucauldian biopolitics. And lastly, it will take a look at how the 
Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben reinterprets Foucaultʼs concept of the 
dispositive by stressing the aspect of desubjectification which enables to take 
control of the lives of living beings.  
 
                                                     
21  The singular “dispositive” refers to the concept. However, when speaking of the object 
level – social relations, discourses, interactions –, it is more suitable to speak of plural “disposi-
tives”, since a society can never be reduced to the operation of a single dispositive of power.  
22  The dispositive of security is, for Foucault, one of three – along with law and discipline – 
“dispositional prototypes” which “can be regarded as major formations of social technologies, 
each characterized by a particular mode of distribution, as they deal with the surrounding world 
and organize human interaction an social relations within this framework” (Raffnsøe, 
Gudmand-Høyer, Thaning 2014: 13). The dispositive of security is thus that organizing prin-
ciple of social relations to which local dispositives always refer; it is, consequently, a meta-
construction postulated by Foucault in order to analyze the logic of local power relations. 
23 
2.1. What is biopolitics? 
The question – what do we mean when we speak of biopolitics? – has been 
touched upon in all the papers included in this thesis. Nevertheless it is impor-
tant to summarize, reiterate and elaborate upon the use of concepts, since simi-
larly to Foucault, my own articles have not made exactly clear the difference 
between biopower and biopolitics, sometimes using the terms synonymously.  
 The article “Biopolitics, Surveillance, and the Subject of ADHD” (publica-
tion I) employs David Hookʼs (2010) distinction between biopolitics and 
biopower, the former understood as a variant of the generic category of the 
latter.23 Biopolitics is “that type of bio-power that targets collectivities, consti-
tuting its subjects as “a people,” “a nation,” “a race” [...]"; furthermore, 
“whereas bio-power begins with the body and its potentials, and seizes life and 
“living being” as its objects, bio-politics is always necessarily a form of 
government, it involves a government–population–political economy relation-
ship [...]” (Hook 2010: 227). This distinction clearly springs from Foucaultʼs 
definitions of biopolitics of the population and anatomo-politics of the human 
body, the former signifying the government of multiplicities of individuals 
understood as populations and the latter meaning bodily disciplines (1978: 139; 
2003c: 243).  
 This kind of processual understanding of politics shows how we can move 
beyond the distinction between anatomo-politics focusing on individual bodies 
                                                     
23  Roberto Esposito (2008) defines the terms according to a different logic. For him, 
biopower designates the power over life, while biopolitics signifies the positive power of life 
(power and capacity immanent in life) (see also Puumeister 2012b). To discuss this with 
some justice would require a separate article, thus I will simply mention the fact that the 
logic focused on in the introductory part is not the only possible one. 
 While this is a useful distinction, it has its limits. Defining biopower and bio-
politics in this manner, we will run into the danger of understanding the indi-
vidual subject as separate from the constructions of collectivities. It is justified 
to speak of different technologies of normalization in the disciplines and in the 
dispositives of security, but this does not mean that we should speak of their 
objects of normalization as either individual or collective. Foucault himself 
emphasizes this point regarding disciplines by stating that “the individual is not 
the primary datum on which discipline is exercised. [...] The individual is much 
more a particular way of dividing up the multiplicity for a discipline than the 
raw material from which it is constructed” (2009: 12). Further down he expli-
citly says that “sovereignty and discipline, as well as security, can only be con-
cerned with multiplicities” (ibid.). We must again state that the individual 
subject is rather a result of technologies of power than its starting point. The 
fundamental point to note is that any aspects of the human beingʼs life, as s/he 
is captured in dispositives of power, are rendered political. Politics should here 
be understood in the sense of Bruno Latour as the “progressive composition of 
collective life” (2005: 40–41), or in other words, as a practice through which 
collectivities and individuals belonging to these collectivities are constructed. 
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and biopolitics focusing on collectivities. Furthermore, it implies that we should 
take the term “biopolitics” as the generic term. If we take normalization to be 
the fundamental function of biopolitics, we can provide its operational defini-
tion as a politics that constructs social relations and that constructs individuals 
and collectivities on the basis of normalization. That is, in the context of bio-
politics, collectivities are formed and delimited according to normalized and, 
perhaps even more fundamentally, normalizable24 ways of life. Thus we can 
speak of collectivities delimited according to age, gender, mental or physical 
health or disorders, etc. These type of collectivities are not formed based direct-
ly on social relations, but within a dispositive of power that constructs possibi-
lities for subjectivation in a social field. Subjects are put in relations to each 
other according to normalized ways of life. And this is the meaning of the state-
ment that biopolitics renders aspects of life political – any bodily or mental25 
feature (for example, a deformity or intelligence quotient) can become the basis 
for a social way of life, a normalized manner of existence. In summary, then, 
the thesis proposes that biopolitics should be used as the generic term since it 
signifies the politicization of life in its biological aspects.  
 Now, regarding the emergence of biopower, Foucault writes that know-
ledge/power has become “an agent of transformation of human life” (1978: 
143). This statement could be interpreted as underscoring the determining 
nature of power over the lives of human beings. However, if we understand 
biopolitics in the more general framework of Foucaultʼs conception of power 
relations that was delineated in the previous chapter, we should resist this kind 
of unilateral interpretation. When Foucault states that with biopower, “the basic 
biological features of the human species became the object of a political 
strategy,” (2009: 1), it should not be taken to mean a process of mere objec-
tification of life, but instead the process through which “the basic biological 
features” were put into play as important or even crucial for the construction of 
social relations and subjects. The argument of the thesis is that the Foucauldian 
understanding of biopower and -politics enables us to conceptualize the capture 
of life in dispositives of power in a way that retains the agency and freedom of 
the process of subjectivation. This is another advantage of using the term 
                                                     
24  The abnormal and “pathological” ways of being and behavior are the ones of which posi-
tive knowledge is often formed, leaving the “normal” undefined. Thus, what is known and 
defined, is the “abnormal” – that which is to be corrected and normalized. See, for example, 
Ian Hackingʼs book The Taming of Chance on statistical normalization in the nineteenth 
century where he writes: “Most of the law-like regularities were first perceived in connection 
with deviancy: suicide, crime, vagrancy, madness, prostitution, disease. This fact is instruc-
tive. It is now common to speak of information and control as a neutral term embracing 
decision theory, operations research, risk analysis and the broader but less well specified 
domains of statistical inference. We shall find that the roots of the idea lie in the notion that 
one can improve – control – a deviant subpopulation by enumeration and classification” 
(Hacking 1990: 3). 
25  Although Byung-Chul Han (2017) has argued that when it comes to the control of mental 
features, we should already speak of “psychopolitics” instead of “biopolitics”, I will not 
pursue this line of thought here as it would require an extensive analysis in itself. 
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biopolitics as the more generic one, since it stresses the political nature of the 
life of humans as living beings – to live means to participate in interaction, in 
communal action; in short, to live signifies socialization and the construction of 
social relations. The (biological) life of living beings is thus not to be under-
stood as a mere object of power, but also as the basis upon which social 
relations can be constructed. The concept that enables us to highlight this dual 
nature of biopolitics – simultaneous subjectification and subjectivation –, is the 
dispositive, to which we now turn.  
 
 
2.2. What is a dispositive? 
The notion of dispositive helps us to conceptualize biopolitics from a semiotic 
perspective, highlighting the processual nature of biopolitics involving not only 
government from above, but the active participation of individuals in relations 
of power through practices of self-government. While in the articles I have 
limited myself strictly to Foucaultʼs understanding of the term, here I will 
attempt to elaborate on the concept by using also a few of his interpreters. 
 Dispositive26 is a concept that Foucault began using when a shift in his work 
from the analysis of knowledge to the relations of power occurred. In short, it 
can be understood as an arrangement of power relations deployed to some 
strategic end. Since Foucault never gave a succinct definition, it is worth 
quoting a rather long passage from an interview in which he explains what he 
means by the concept: 
 
What Iʼm trying to pick out with this term is, firstly, a thoroughly heterogeneous 
ensemble consisting of discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory 
decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, 
moral and philantropic propositions – in short, the said as much as the unsaid. 
Such are the elements of the apparatus. The apparatus itself is the system of 
relations that can be established between these elements. Secondly, what I am 
trying to identify in this apparatus is precisely the nature of the connection that 
can exist between these heterogeneous elements. [...] Thirdly, I understand by 
the term ʻapparatusʼ a sort of – shall we say – formation which has as its major 
function at a given historical moment that of responding to an urgent need. The 
apparatus thus has a dominant strategic function. (Foucault 1980b: 194–195, 
original italics) 
 
                                                     
26  The French word for the concept is dispositif, which is commonly translated as “appa-
ratus” and sometimes as well as “deployment”. In the introductory part of the thesis, I use 
the term “dispositive” throughout for similar reasons as articulated by Bussolini (2010) and 
Raffnsøe, Gudmand-Høyer, Thaning (2014) – namely that the term dispositive has a wider 
scope and refers to the logic of a network of relations, while “apparatus” is more closely 
related either to technology in the narrow sense or to “state apparatuses” in Althusserʼs 
(1971) sense. It is nevertheless useful to keep in mind that whenever one of “apparatus”, 
“deployment”, “dispositive”, or “dispositif” appears, it refers to the same concept. 
26 
Giorgio Agamben has summarized Foucaultʼs lengthy explanation in a useful 
manner by emphasizing three points:  
 
a.  It is a heterogeneous set that includes virtually anything, linguistic and non-
linguistic, under the same heading [...]. The apparatus itself is the network 
that is established between these elements. 
b.  The apparatus always has a concrete strategic function and is always located 
in a power relation. 
c.  As such, it appears at the intersection of power relations and relations of 
knowledge.  (Agamben 2009: 2–3) 
 
Thus, the dispositive is a network of heterogeneous elements. Highlighting its 
heterogeneous nature, Philippe Verhaegen (1999: 112) has called the dispositive 
a “techno-semiotic bricolage”. The notion of bricolage, borrowed from Claude 
Lévi-Strauss (1966[1962]) and signifying the creative – that is, not previously 
structured – use of objects in order to solve a problem, helps us to understand 
the dispositive first and foremost as both an ongoing practice of assembling and 
as the outcome of this practice – it is thus not a pre-given or ready-made struc-
ture, but a constant (re)productive practice requiring the active participation of 
subjects. Consequently, the connection between power and knowledge becomes 
important – dispositive operates in the context of power/knowledge. We can say 
that within a dispositive, knowledge is put to work and we can no longer speak 
of the separate domains of discursive communication and governmental techno-
logies. Knowledge is technical/instrumental and technologies are based on 
knowledge (see Peeters and Charlier 1999). It is in this sense that Foucault 
(2000c) speaks of “political rationality” or “reason”: an instrumental know-
ledge, knowledge put to work in the process of ordering social relations and in 
the construction and control of social subjects. 
 The construction of subjectivity is at the center of Foucaultʼs understanding 
of the dispositive; it is through participation in the dispositive that an individual 
is rendered into a social subject. For example, the dispositive of sexuality 
constructs subjects that find the very truth of themselves in their sexuality 
(Foucault 1978) and the disciplinary dispositive called the Panopticon const-
ructs docile subjects who practice self-discipline (Foucault 1977). First and 
foremost, then, the dispositive is an arrangement of elements that influences the 
behavior of individuals and that structures the possible field of actions of 
individuals (see also Raffnsøe 2008). André Berten (1999: 42) has even pro-
posed that the dispositive could be conceptualized as an “environment": “Dispo-
sitives are a way of understanding human beingʼs natural or constructed 
environment not as a space of knowledge acquisition and transmission, but as a 
network that mediates knowledge [...].” We should examine this statement more 
closely since it will help us to conceptualize the semiotic nature of the dis-
positive.  
 Berten suggests that we understand by dispositive an environment within 
which it becomes possible to experience the social world. Within a dispositive, 
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individuals become subjects of knowledge, but simultaneously they are trans-
formed into objects of (governmental and instrumental) knowledge.  
 Bertenʼs suggestion to view dispositive as an environment mediating know-
ledge opens up the possibility to understand it in terms of a social umwelt27 in 
Jakob von Uexküllʼs sense as a subjectively meaningful universe (Uexküll 
1957[1934]; 1982[1940]), an environment that is delimited by the network of 
subjective semiotic relations. The concept of umwelt is essentially Uexküllʼs 
modification of the notion of milieu, which was “imported from mechanics into 
biology during the second half of the eighteenth century” and which the “French 
mechanists of the eighteenth century called [...] what Newton had referred to as 
“fluid” (Canguilhem 2008: 99). With the concept of milieu, “the problem 
mechanics had to solve was that of the action of distinct physical bodies at a 
distance” (ibid.). In his early writing, Uexküll himself used milieu as meaning 
“the part of the external world that affects animals” (cited in Brentari 2015: 63). 
Milieu is thus a mediated and mediating part of the surrounding world. In his 
attempt to think of how living beings construct their own world according to 
their physiological constitution, Uexküll replaced the milieu with umwelt – the 
environment that has the subject at its center. In the words of Georges Can-
guilhem, “the Umwelt of the animal is nothing other than a milieu centered in 
relation to that subject of vital values in which the living essentially consists” 
(2008: 112). We could say that biopolitical normalization manipulates those 
values based on which the human as a living being constructs its umwelt. 
 Now, Foucault himself, in conceptualizing biopolitics, uses the term milieu, 
and thus we are faced with the problem of why should we relate umwelt with 
the dispositive rather than with the milieu. In an attempt to provide an answer to 
this problem, let us take a look at what the milieu signifies for Foucault. For 
him, it is, first and foremost, “that in which circulation is carried out,” and 
further:  
 
The milieu is a set of natural givens – rivers, marshes, hills – and a set of 
artificial givens – an agglomeration of individuals, of houses, etcetera. The 
milieu is a certain number of combined, overall effects bearing on all who live in 
it. It is an element in which a circular link is produced between effects and 
causes, since an effect from one point of view will be a cause from another. [...] 
Finally, the milieu appears as a field of intervention in which, instead of 
affecting individuals as a set of legal subjects capable of voluntary actions – 
which would be the case of sovereignty – and instead of affecting them as a 
                                                     
27  The concept of umwelt is not at all absent from social theory, being used, for example, by 
Alfred Schutz (1967[1932]) in his social phenomenology to designate the directly expe-
rienced social reality. Schutz defines it as distinct from Mitwelt (the world of contempo-
raries), Vorwelt (of predecessors), and Folgewelt (of successors). Peter Berger and Thomas 
Luckmann (1991), who are greatly influenced by Schutz, do not use the term umwelt, but on 
a couple of occasions employ the term milieu in a rather non-technical sense. Instead of um-
welt, they speak of “reality”. The term “milieu”, which has a larger scope – that is, is not de-
limited by subjectivity, but designates the external conditions of human existence in general 
– was already prominently present in Auguste Comteʼs social theory (see Canguilhem 2008).  
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multiplicity of organisms, of bodies capable of performances, and of required 
performances – as in discipline – one tries to affect, precisely, a population. 
(2009: 21). 
 
Population – defined as “a multiplicity of individuals who are and funda-
mentally and essentially only exist biologically bound to the materiality within 
which they live” (ibid.) – being, for Foucault, the fundamental subject of 
biopolitics, the notion of milieu appears as that through which the population 
can be accessed and its vital processes can be made governable. The milieu is a 
medium through which the population can be affected, intervened in not 
directly, but “at a distance”. As we recall, this aspect of the milieu is directly 
connected with Foucaultʼs understanding of government in general – govern-
ment as the structuration of the possible field of actions of others. 
 The notion of milieu, however, does not entail the aspect of subjectivity. 
And furthermore, in its focus on circulation and causality, can be too readily 
interpreted in mechanistic terms, a risk identified also by Canguilhem who 
writes that the milieu, in its neo-Lamarckian guise, for example, “becomes a 
universal instrument for the dissolution of individualized organic syntheses into 
the anonymity of universal elements and movements” (2008: 103). The living 
being is reduced to the determination of external conditioning. Thus it seems 
necessary to speak, in the context of biopolitics, of the connection of dispositive 
and umwelt, since both concepts deal specifically with the structuration of sub-
jectivity and subjective world(s). Interpreted along the lines of umwelt, dis-
positive emerges as a properly semiotic concept, enabling us to analyze the 
(simultaneous) semiotic construction of subjectivity and its context.  
 When umwelt is viewed from the Foucauldian perspective through the lens 
of the dispositive, we will begin to understand that any type of subjective social 
environment potentially transforms individuals into objects of knowledge, 
captures them within governmental relations, and in this sense, conducts their 
conduct so that it would conform to the norms set by this structured environ-
ment. In sum, becoming a knowing subject through the delimitation of a sub-
jective universe is always accompanied by the normative aspects of the dispo-
sitives of power that influence and affect individualsʼ behaviors. The inter-
pretation of the dispositive as a concept close to umwelt is justified by Fou-
caultʼs (1986; 1988; 1990) conceptualization of the technologies of the self. 
Technologies of the self, or of life (bios) emphasize the active participation of 
individuals in their self-construction; in other words, they stress individualsʼ 
freedom in the context of power relations. This does not mean that freedom 
would be a property of an individual liberated from sociopolitical relations. 
Quite the contrary, freedom signifies for Foucault a political praxis made 
possible by the contingent nature of dispositives. There is no subject outside 
dispositives; however, subjectivation is a process that always has the poten-
tiality to disrupt the normative workings of dispositives. Johanna Oksala sums 
this point up nicely:  
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For Foucault, freedom refers to the indeterminateness of the constitutive matrix 
and to the contingency of all structures. It is the virtual fractures that appear in 
the invisible walls of our world, the opening up of possibilities for seeing how 
that which is might no longer be what it is. Freedom does not mean that every-
thing is possible, but neither is the present a necessity. (2005: 208) 
 
The Uexküllian umwelt emphasizes the role of the subject in the construction 
and constitution of its very own specific universe; life assumes the form of 
subjectivation, thus enabling us to cast aside the vague notion of “life itself” 
which is too readily reducible to “bare life” (as will be seen shortly in section 
2.5). The Foucauldian dispositive stresses that the constitution of a subjective 
universe is always a political activity interwoven with power relations and 
objectifications of subjectivity. Whenever the social umwelt is analyzed, it is not 
enough to stress the subjective construction of meanings. Complementing 
umwelt-theory with the concept of dispositive allows us to consider that the 
elements and relations that become meaningful for the subject are not neutral, 
but embedded in power relations. Reverting the perspective and conceptualizing 
the dispositive in terms of the umwelt, allows us to notice the active parti-
cipation of individuals when analyzing social mechanisms of subjectification.  
 
 
2.3. Dispositive and normalization 
When Foucault speaks of biopolitics he does this most often through the notion 
of normalization, even speaking of a “normalizing society” (1978: 144).28 The 
focus on normalization when analyzing power relations is a strategy to move 
beyond the framework of sovereignty and law. One of Foucaultʼs aims was 
exactly to “cut off the kingʼs head” (2003c: 59) in political theory, and through 
this, to understand sovereignty as only one element of the dispositives of power. 
The specific practices and technologies of normalization and the relations of 
power inherent in society gain a more prominent position than the commands of 
the king. In Security, Territory, Population where Foucault distinguishes between 
three general dispositives of power – the juridico-legal, disciplinary, and security 
–, he writes:  
 
This word “disposer” is important because, what enabled sovereignty to achieve 
its aim of obedience to the laws, was the law itself; law and sovereignty were 
absolutely united. Here, on the contrary, it is not a matter of imposing a law on 
men, but of the disposition of things, that is to say, of employing tactics rather 
than laws, or, of as far as possible employing laws as tactics; arranging things so 
that this or that end may be achieved through a certain number of means. 
(Foucault 2009: 99). 
 
                                                     
28  In the 1974–1975 lecture course entitled Abnormal (Foucault 2003b), before he began 
using the terms biopower and biopolitics, Foucault speaks of the “power of normalization” 
as that power through which the figures of abnormality are constituted and politicized. 
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This aspect of the “disposition of things” is absolutely fundamental to Foucault 
in order to analyze the government of human beings on the basis of norma-
lization. The emergence of biopolitics, according to Foucault, can be analyzed 
on the basis of a new political subject – the population – constructed as an 
object of knowledge and subject of action within the dispositive of security. 
Biopolitics is a specific form of government which understand human beings 
and their relations with and within their environment as natural phenomena 
(Foucault 2009: 70–75). Biopolitics is a form of conducting the conduct of 
individuals, and through this government, of constructing normalizable socio-
political subjectivity – of subjectification. 
 We should not, however, understand Foucaultʼs insistence on an analysis of 
power beyond the juridico-legal dispositive as a statement that law or sove-
reignty have been historically overcome and a new era of normalization has 
arrived: “There is not the legal age, the disciplinary age, and then the age of 
security. [...] In reality you have a series of complex edifices [...] in which what 
above all changes is the dominant characteristic, [...] the system of correlation 
between juridico-legal mechanisms, disciplinary mechanisms, and mechanisms 
of security” (Foucault 2009: 8). Consequently, sovereignty does not disappear, 
but when the dispositive of security becomes dominant, it begins to function in 
a new way, becomes dependent on different aspects of power and knowledge. 
Above all, sovereignty becomes dependent on new types of normalization 
operative in the disciplinary and security dispositives. 
 The publications included in this thesis have touched upon the types of 
normalization in different dispositives, thus here I will provide only a short 
summary. The juridico-legal dispositive separates the legal and the illegal and 
defines the negative, what should not be done, and in this sense, it is normative 
only in the sense that it defines what is prohibited. Disciplinary normalization 
posits a model to which individuals must conform, norm is primary. The 
dispositive of security, however, searches for norms in the activity and behavior 
of human beings, attempts to “discover” the “natural” norms of populations: 
“The normal comes first and the norm is deduced from it [...]” (Foucault 2009: 
63). “Natural” does not, however, mean intrinsic to living beings themselves. 
Instead, a norm is something that is constituted on the basis of “an average 
considered as optimal on the one hand, and, on the other, a bandwidth of the 
acceptable that must not be exceeded” (ibid., 6). The naturalness of a population 
and its norms become constituted, for example, by the governmental technology 
called statistics (see Hacking 1990). What is the “normal” crime rate of a 
society? The “normal” amount of people suffering from small pox? What 
should the “optimal” number of children per family be in order for the popu-
lation to increase? What is the actual rate of mortality of infants and what is the 
optimal? When is the number low enough so that we can speak of a “normal” 
situation? And subjectivation has to occur within an environment structured 
according to these “optimizations” or “normalizations” – the number of children 
can become a signifier of normality and thus of oneʼs proper place in a society. 
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 The term “security” in the context of the dispositive of security does not, 
firstly, refer to insurance against injury from an external force (be it another 
person or another state). Secondly, “security” does not refer either to the well-
being and safety of the “sovereign and his territory” (Foucault 2009: 65). It 
refers instead to making sure that the vital process of (re)production, circulation 
of goods and movements of individuals function without major obstacles. In 
other words, security here refers to the insurance of a smooth process of life. 
Vital processes cannot be viewed apart from the milieu of humans as living 
beings, which is why it has also been argued that biopolitics does not, in the 
first place, intervene directly on life, but instead structures its surroundings in 
order to secure living processes (see Hull 2013).  
 Government according to the dispositive of security consists in “natural” 
government that attempts to conduct the behavior of individuals so that society 
would attain its optimal state. And the process of subjectivation – how indi-
viduals turn themselves into subjects – is conditioned by and occurs within the 
context of a “normalized” society, a society structured according to processes 
and norms seen as intrinsic or natural to it. And any sovereign decision has to 
take this highly structured – and knowable – field into account; the sovereignʼs 
decisions are conditioned by this normalized, “natural” social space.  
 The conjunction of population–milieu–normalization is what makes the 
dispositive of security paradigmatic for biopolitics. The population is a subject-
object that enables power to take hold of these processes of life and to render 
them governable. Structuring the milieu understood as the material (both 
artificial and natural) environment of the population enables government to 
conduct the conduct of humans as living beings. Knowledge of the behavior of 
individuals as collective populations within their material milieu enables them 
to be captured in the complex of power/knowledge.  
 When Foucault speaks of the inclusion of life into politics, he does not have 
in mind that humans as political beings are reduced to mere biological life. 
Instead he analyzes how a new kind of political subject-object emerges in the 
figure of the population, a figure that enables power to capture biological pro-
cesses of life as political. Foucaultʼs analysis focuses on the specific techno-
logies and rationalities of power and government as social practices of structu-
ring human environment. This does not mean, however, that normalization does 
not occur at the individual level. As noted above, we should be wary of the 
simple distinction between individuals and populations – we can even say that 
in the context of biopolitical normalization individualization always occurs with 
reference to populational norms. This is also to say that the individual is always 
already a trans-individual.29 And vice versa, populational norms can be em-
bodied in concrete individuals.  
                                                     
29  On the concept of trans-individuality, see Simondon (1989); Combes (2013). 
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2.4. Normativity and normalization:  
Canguilhem on biopolitics 
Nevertheless, we should ask whether Foucault speaks of life from the biological 
perspective and, if so, from which specific perspective does he speak? What is 
the figure of life that is being normalized through dispositives of power? We 
have already answered that it is the ways of life according to which social 
subjectivation is simultaneously delimited, constrained and made possible. That 
is, the ways in which an individual is able to exist in a social environment, or, in 
a dispositive. It is now necessary to elaborate on these remarks according to 
Georges Canguilhemʼs approach to normalization and normativity – and it is 
through this that we can further conceptualize the positivity of biopolitics. 
Foucaultʼs debt on the understanding of life in biopolitics to Canguilhem has 
already been noted by, for example, Maria Muhle (2014a; 2014b) and Catherine 
Mills (2013).  
 Both Muhle and Mills underscore the importance of the notion of “error” in 
Canguilhemʼs concept of life. In the words of Mills (2013: 75), “biopower is 
less a matter of controlling life that it is a matter of managing error – or rather, it 
is the former by virtue of the latter.” Error as a fundamental notion is high-
lighted by Foucault in the essay “Life: Experience and Science”, by saying that 
“life – and this is its radical feature – is that which is capable of error” (2000d: 
476). Canguilhem himself explores the importance of error in the essays “Con-
cept and Life” (1966) and “A New Concept in Pathology: Error”, appended to 
the 1966 edition of The Normal and the Pathological (1991), where he posits 
knowledge as immanent to the living process and connects the latter to 
information, being influenced by discoveries made in genetics. Error and the 
potentiality to go wrong, however, should not, in Canguilhem, be related solely 
to the – by now already rather outdated30 – discovery of genetic code-as-lan-
guage, but is present already in his understanding of normativity inherent in the 
living process. 
 The presence of the possibility of error derives from Canguilhemʼs under-
standing of lifeʼs inherent “normativity”,31 a concept that is juxtaposed to 
“normal” and “normalization”. “"Normal” is the term used by the nineteenth 
century to designate the scholastic prototype and the state of organic health” 
(Canguilhem 1991[1966]: 237); it thus indicates a normal state according to 
                                                     
30  On language and information as metaphors for the description of the genetic code, see 
Kay (2000). 
31  We should keep in mind that when Canguilhem speaks of the normativity of life, he 
almost always speaks of the living process of the individual living being. It is not, however, 
unproblematic to ascribe the individual organism a central and originary role in the construc-
tion of its milieu (Lecourt 1998), and furthermore, it is not at all clear what Canguilhem 
means when he speaks of individuality: can both the cell as well as the organisms be con-
sidered individuals, and is the society an individual capable of intentional action (Gayon 
1998)? Individuality, in Canguilhem, is a relational concept that defies any substantial 
definition, and thus it is, again, conceptually close to the notion of the semiotic subject.   
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which the subjectʼs health is evaluated. Presupposing a normal state presumes 
that health and disease can be discovered as if they were positive, objective 
facts, independent of the subject. Furthermore, positing the pathological as 
simply a deviation from the normal state, presupposes that the pathological is 
describable on the basis of normality, the latter being conceptualized then as 
“abnormal”. Canguilhem, for his part, strives to conceptualize the pathological 
as ontologically different from the normal, and to this end he does not connect it 
with the normal, but with normativity.  
 Normativity is defined by Canguilhem as “the biological capacity to 
challenge the usual norms in case of critical situations” (1991: 284). Or again: 
“Normative, in the fullest sense of the word, is that which establishes norms” 
(1991: 126–127). The normative capacity of organisms thus consists in es-
tablishing new norms in critical situations, or in other words, when being sick, 
not to restore some kind of ideal normal state, but to recover to normal func-
tioning by instituting new norms (see also Margree 2002). Health, for Canguil-
hem, means first and foremost the capacity of normativity, or, the capacity to 
adapt to conditions posed by pathologies and the environment. Normativity, 
thus, means to break (old) norms rather than follow them. 
 Underlying this conceptualization of normativity is Canguilhemʼs under-
standing of life as polarity (1991: 128). And it is in the context of polarity that 
the living process emerges as a constant activity of valorization: “The value of 
life, that is, life as value, life in its inner normativity, is thus founded on its own 
uncertainty or precariousness (précarité). The normative dynamics of life 
unfold between the two poles: the preservation of the internal organic equilib-
rium [...], and the permanent challenge to this very equilibrium” (Muhle 2014a: 
85). When Canguilhem writes that there “is no biological indifference” (1991: 
129), and that this is the basis on which we can speak of normativity in the first 
place, this means that everything that the living being is related to acquires 
either a positive or a negative value. Canguilhem is very close to Uexküll here – 
for the latter the living being can only be indifferent to that with which it has no 
relation at all: there can be no neutral objects in umwelt, everything acquires a 
significance, a meaning (Uexküll 1982). To have meaning is to have value for 
the subject (see also Kull 2011). 
 In order to inquire into what Canguilhem could have to say about biopolitics, 
let us briefly take a look at the interpretation provided by Catherine Mills. For 
Mills, biopolitics is necessarily “reactive in relation to life” (2013: 75). Why? 
She explains that the “errancy internal to life constantly provokes the biopoli-
tical state, forcing it to respond to the contingencies of the living and the pheno-
mena of life” (Mills 2013: 89). For her, the biopolitical dispositive of security 
can only respond and react to the processes of life. Reactivity does not, how-
ever, signify negativity that is characteristic of sovereign power that operates 
through privation and death. Neither does it signify negativity in the sense of 
oppression. The capturing of life into normalizing dispositives can simulta-
neously be a reactive and productive process. And indeed, it is in biopoliticsʼ 
reactivity that we can find the formulation of the positivity of biopolitics. 
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 In order to explain this, we need to turn back to the distinction between 
normalization and normativity. To normalize means to define a way of life 
according to a normal state, which means also that a living being is captured 
within relations in a social artificial-natural umwelt through which s/he comes to 
be defined. To normalize means thus to define a way of life as a positive fact, 
one that is delimitable as an object of knowledge. Normalization does not, then, 
have as its object the body of an organism itself, but its relations within an 
umwelt. This, in turn, means that the inherent normativity of a living being is 
captured within normalized relations that are posited as definitive of a “proper” 
way of life. Normativity – defined by the polarity of positive and negative – is 
captured within a set of positively knowable relations. Positivity here signifies, 
then, a lack of polarity. 
 Now, this capture of the polarity of life into positivity does not, of course, 
mean that we could conceptualize a division between, on the one hand, the 
dynamism of life, and on the other, the static nature of biopolitical normali-
zation. The relation between life and power is not that of process and structure. 
We need to understand the normalization of biopolitical dispositives itself as 
contingent and inherently changeable – as dynamic. As Canguilhem himself has 
noted, social norms are never “those of the whole society” (1991: 156). And 
indeed, we should be careful in speaking of a biopolitical dispositive or a 
society in the singular; rather, biopolitical normalization always occurs within 
the context of agonistic relations in which norms are constantly contested and 
inherently contestable.32 That is, we cannot speak of a society as a whole be-
cause it is constantly being constructed through different and differing sites of 
normalization, that is, dispositives that are themselves in agonistic relations of 
constant (re)construction. In short, since a society is an ongoing process of 
association (see Latour 2005), there can be no single and totalized social umwelt 
or dispositive. There is always a multiplicity of (competing) normalizing dispo-
sitives in the ongoing construction of society – social norms need to be “in-
vented”, as Canguilhem puts it (1991: 259), which results in the multiplicity of 
norms (see Mol 1998) and in the precarity of “human institutions” (Canguilhem 
1991: 197). 
 Canguilhemʼs notion of life as the ongoing process of normativity – of 
creating norms – is inherently open to biopolitical conceptualization as it is based 
on the very same concept of norm that is at the center of Foucauldian biopolitics. 
It is not only politics that prescribes norms to life, but it is also life that constructs 
norms in a socio-political context. This fact makes thinkable both the possibility 
of resistance in the context of biopolitics and the possibility that life can be 
normalized politically – through institutional practices, discourses, power 
relations, etc. – in the first place. Life, insofar as it is normative, can also be 
normalized and managed, captured into the positivity of dispositives. 
                                                     
32  See, for example, Foucaultʼs understanding of government in “The Subject and Power” 
(1982), or how Chantal Mouffe (2000) undestands the social as a field traversed by agonistic 
relations. 
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2.5. The Agambenian dispositive:  
bare life in the biopolitical machine 
Giorgio Agamben reinterprets Foucaultʼs notion of the dispositive and in the 
process provides a different perspective on the figure of life in biopolitics. In 
contrast to Foucault, who analyzes the production of subjects, Agambenʼs focus 
lies on the production of bare life, or in other words, on desubjectification. His 
perspective is important to take into account since it reveals an important aspect 
of biopolitical dispositives: accompanying every process of subjectivation is a 
potential for desubjectification. Agambenʼs interpretation of the dispositive 
will, however, be approached critically because of the way it highlights the pri-
mary role of objects and technology in the narrow sense.  
 Before moving on to the dispositive, a few introductory words on Agam-
benʼs development of the concept of biopolitics. Agamben understands Fou-
caultʼs attempt to “cut off the kingʼs head” and his focus on the specific techni-
ques of normalization as inhibiting a full understanding of biopolitics. He seeks 
to reintroduce sovereignty as the fundamental concept according to which bio-
politics can be analyzed. According to this shift in focus, he analyzes biopolitics 
as producing bare life that is exposed to sovereign violence. Agamben concep-
tualizes bare life as that which is a necessary precondition for any politics, but 
which must be excluded in order that the constitution of a political way of life 
be made possible. The result of this inclusive exclusion is a life that can be 
killed with impunity, that is, a life abandoned by the juridical order and exposed 
to the sovereign decision that performs via the force of law, while the norma-
lizing and structuring aspects of law are suspended. Biopolitics, for Agamben, 
is thus describable as a state of exception in which the law is embodied in the 
sovereign who has the prerogative of deciding over the value of life. (Agamben 
1998; 2005; 2016) Presupposing the primacy of sovereignty, Agamben can 
extend the concept of biopolitics to the whole of Western politics and state that, 
“in its origin Western politics is also biopolitics” (2004: 80). The notion of 
biopolitics thus loses its specificity and begins to signify any type of politics. 
 In the essay “What Is an Apparatus?”, Agamben generalizes Foucaultʼs con-
cept of the dispositive and understands it as anything that produces subjects out 
of living beings. He states that we have “two great classes: living beings (or 
substances) and apparatuses. And, between these two, as a third class, subjects. 
I call a subject that which results from the relation and, so to speak, from the 
relentless fight between living beings and apparatuses” (Agamben 2009: 14). 
This is a generalization in the opposite direction to what I proposed earlier. 
While I suggested that the dispositive could be understood in terms of umwelt 
which can only be provisionally delineated in its heterogeneity, Agambenʼs 
proposal leads him to consider even singular objects as dispositives:  
 
[...] I shall call an apparatus literally anything that has in some way the capacity 
to capture, orient, determine, intercept, model, control, or secure the gestures, 
behaviors, opinions, or discourses of living beings. Not only, therefore, prisons, 
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madhouses, the panopticon, schools, confession, factories, disciplines, juridical 
measures, and so forth [...], but also the pen, writing, literature, philosophy, agri-
culture, cigarettes, navigation, computers, cellular telephones and – why not – 
language itself, which is perhaps the most ancient of apparatuses [...]. (2009: 14) 
 
A dispositive can simultaneously be something very general and something 
extremely specific. Let us consider the example of the cigarette – on what 
grounds could we call it a dispositive? It is true that the cigarette shapes beha-
vior: guides the hand to the mouth, forces one to go outside if smoking is not 
allowed inside, structures oneʼs behavior to have a cigarette at regular intervals, 
etc. But is the cigarette, in this sense – in itself – a dispositive? Following Fou-
cault, we could give the name “dispositive of the cigarette” to a network of 
relations established between knowledges (medical, psychological, economic, 
artistic), institutions (production industries, marketing teams, hospitals, etc.), 
laws, norms, etc. In other words, the “dispositive of the cigarette” would signify 
a network of semiotic relations within which a living being behaves and acts – 
and not a specific object. Now, if we include under the notion of dispositive 
common objects in their own right, this would enable us to focus primarily on 
desubjectification – that is, objectification – and fragmentation. The cigarette, to 
continue with this example, only regulates certain compulsive and repetitive 
behaviors while indeed it does not construct a new subjectivity. Faced with 
objects, an individualʼs behavior can be affected, but s/he is not for that reason 
subjectivized. Agamben generalizes this partiality and fragmented nature of 
dispositives to our contemporary societies: “What defines the apparatuses that 
we have to deal with in the current phase of capitalism is that they no longer act 
as much through the production of a subject, as through the processes of what 
can be called desubjectification” (2009: 20).  
 Another example Agamben uses is the cellular telephone of which he writes: 
“He who lets himself be captured by the “cellular telephone” apparatus [...] 
cannot acquire a new subjectivity, but only a number through which he can, 
eventually, be controlled” (2009: 21).33 In other words, the individual is reduced 
to a number through which s/he can be monitored and put under surveillance – 
s/he is made knowable as that number. It is no longer the living being we are 
talking about, but its “data double”, to use Haggerty and Ericsonʼs (2000) 
formulation. The individual living being is separated from its actual behavior by 
the process of objectification as a data unit. This line of reasoning helps us 
understand why Agamben calls the relations between living beings and dis-
positives a “relentless fight”: entering a dispositive, something of a living being 
is extracted and what is extracted is put in his or her place – a telephone number 
                                                     
33  In an essay entitled “Postscript on the Societies of Control”, Gilles Deleuze follows a 
similar line of thought by conceptualizing individuals as deconstructible into dividuals in the 
context of modern digital technologies of surveillance and control: “The numerical language 
of control is made of codes that mark access to information, or reject it. We no longer find 
ourselves dealing with the mass/individual pair. Individuals have become “dividuals”, and 
masses, samples, data, markets, or “banks”” (1992: 5, original italics). 
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and the behaviors (calls, text messages, purchases, movements tracked through 
GPS, etc.) associated with it now represent the individual living being. A double 
movement, then: on the one hand, the living human being uses objects that do 
not provide anything but “spectral forms” (Agamben 2009: 21) of subjectivity, 
and on the other, s/he is objectified by what is extracted from him or her and 
captured in a dispositive.  
 That is, what is known and what is said of the living being have, in actuality, 
very little to do with the living being itself. Agamben articulates this separation 
of living beings and languages in The Sacrament of Language: 
 
On the one hand, there is the living being, more and more reduced to a purely 
biological reality and to bare life. On the other hand, there is the speaking being, 
artificially divided from the former, through a multiplicity of technico-mediatic 
apparatuses, in an experience of the word that grows ever more vain, for which it is 
impossible to be responsible and in which anything like a political experience be-
comes more and more precarious. When the ethical – and not simply cognitive – 
connection that unites words, things, and human actions is broken, this in fact 
promotes a spectacular and unprecedented proliferation of vain words on the one 
hand and, on the other, of legislative apparatuses that seek obstinately to legislate 
on every aspect of that life on which they seem no longer to have any hold. 
(Agamben 2011: 70–71) 
 
Here “apparatuses” function as sites of separation, of reduction of living beings 
to bare life. It seems to me that here we can unproblematically use the term 
“apparatus”, since Agamben explicitly references their “technico-mediatic” 
aspects.34 We are not dealing so much with material-semiotic networks, but, we 
could say, with technology in the narrow sense that has as its main function the 
separation of living beings from linguistic semiosis – the type of semiosis that 
makes a human out of a living being. Agambenʼs treatment of the dispositive 
thus echoes Heideggerʼs conceptualization of technology as that which orders 
human beings into a “standing-reserve” (Heidegger 1977; see also Campbell 
2011: ch. 2). Human beingsʼ ethical relation with language is cut, and this sepa-
ration results in putting humans in the service of technology – ready for dis-
posing as necessary. When apparatuses speak for the living beings, the latter 
end up being nothing other than cogs in the machine, or in other words, living 
beings lose the ability to live in a meaningful manner, they lose the capacity for 
semiosis. 
 This explicitly technological and alienating aspect of contemporary disposi-
tives is, of course, not an insignificant aspect of their functioning and should not 
be dismissed. Nevertheless, it would be misleading to ground the notion of the 
dispositive onto a technological base – this would too easily lead us to thinking 
along the lines of technological determinism according to which each new 
popular device alienates the human being further from him or herself. More-
                                                     
34  Although originally, Agamben (2006) uses the Italian word “dispositivo”. It is in the 
English translation that it is transformed into “apparatus”. 
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over, we could run into the danger of conceptualizing the broader, non-material, 
dispositives – such as language, literature – on the basis of technology in the 
narrow, material sense.  
 
*** 
  
Foucault and Agamben provide us with two distinct routes for conceptualizing 
the connections between semiotics and biopolitics. For Foucault, the emphasis 
is on the construction and production of subjectivity through normalization and 
government. Agamben puts the emphasis on the production of bare life aban-
doned by the juridical order and exposed to the sovereign decision. These 
distinct perspectives result in a differing use of a central analytic concept – the 
dispositive. Foucault understands the dispositive to be a network of hetero-
geneous elements within which subjectivity is articulated – in this sense, he 
even speaks of a “dispositive of subjectivity” (Foucault 2005: 319). I have pro-
posed that we understand the Foucauldian dispositive as closely tied to Uex-
küllʼs notion of the umwelt – the dispositive as a normative and normalizing 
social environment rendering subjectivation possible. The primary analytic 
focus would here be on the subjective semiotic relations through which techno-
logies of the self are joined together with technologies of power and govern-
ment. 
 In reintroducing sovereignty into biopolitical theory, Agamben understands 
biopolitics not as the formation of social relations through production of subjec-
tivity, but as the reduction of ways of life to bare life exposed to sovereign 
violence. The Agambenian view on the concept of dispositive reflects this. The 
dispositive functions for him more in the manner of a technological apparatus, a 
machine for capturing the lives of human beings that become objectified and 
separated from their lives. Living beings captured in the apparatuses are 
separated from their semiotic capacities – human beings from language – and 
thus they are reduced to merely living beings without agency. We could thus 
say that Agambenʼs perspective on biopolitics stresses semiotic destruction, not 
production, or more precisely, the incapacitation of living beingsʼ semiosis – the 
relation of human beings and language is cut. 
 The argument of the thesis is that biopolitics operates primarily through 
subjectification – the production of subjectivity, but it is important to keep in 
mind also the potential desubjectifications and objectifications that Agamben 
speaks about. However, his interpretation of the dispositive veers too far into 
the territory of technological determinism which is generalized to all disposi-
tives. In what follows, we will operate with the Foucauldian dispositive coupled 
with the notion of umwelt in which the potentiality of Agambenian desubjecti-
fication always lurks. We should thus keep in mind Foucaultʼs statement that it 
is not the case “that everything is bad, but that everything is dangerous” (1984b: 
343). 
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3. FREEDOM AND SUBJECTIVITY IN  
THE CONTEXT OF BIOPOLITICS 
 
So far we have treated the question of the subject in biopolitics along the lines 
of Foucaultʼs general understanding of power and government in which the 
subject is conceived as not merely an object of power, but as capable of acting 
on account of him or herself, and consequently, of constructing oneself with 
freedom, albeit in the context of power relations.35 When writing about biopoli-
tics, we have to consider, at least briefly, another approach to the relation 
between power and subjectivity that has been largely influential in biopolitical 
theorizations. This approach underlines the process of desubjectification, objec-
tification, and dehumanization in the context of biopolitics. Here, the subject is 
understood to be reduced to “sheer life” or “bare life” and, consequently, 
stripped of the potentiality of meaningful political action. Biopolitics, in this 
sense, reduces human beings to the state of mere survival. The previous chapter 
dealt briefly with desubjectification when outlining Giorgio Agambenʼs reinter-
pretation of Foucaultʼs concept of the dispositive. The aim of this chapter is to 
examine in more general terms the way in which theorists like Hannah Arendt 
and Agamben understand biopolitics as the emergence of an object of politics – 
“life itself” – separate from the subject and, consequently, conceptualize bio-
politics as a quasi-politics or a politics that precludes the potentiality of free-
dom. This approach is then countered by Foucaultʼs conceptualization of bio-
politics as not the reduction of politics, but as the expansion and multiplication 
of the potential for political action. 
 
 
3.1. Biopolitics vs. politics 
The model of politics according to which freedom of the subject is commonly 
thought, is deliberative politics with reference to the Ancient Greek polis as a 
site within which politics is made possible. This is the ideal model of politics 
for Hannah Arendt who attempted to understand the new post-World War II 
context within which Western human beings found themselves. In The Human 
Condition (1998[1958]) she argues that, in modern society, political action in 
the Greek (Athenian) sense is no longer possible since life has been made the 
highest good of society. “Sheer life” (zoē), as opposed to the “good life” (bios), 
has entered the public realm and thus politics has been transformed into the 
management of survival of human beings. Although Arendt never uses the 
terms biopolitics or biopower, her analysis of the entrance of sheer life into 
modern politics is the reason why she is considered to be a “theorist of bio-
politics avant la lèttre” (Braun 2007: 7).  
                                                     
35  I have dealt with the question of simultaneous subjectification and subjectivation 
processes in my bachelorʼs thesis; and the article “Self-construction of the subject in the 
context of power relations” was published (Puumeister 2012a). 
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 Arendtʼs analysis of modern politics is informed by Aristotleʼs (2002) 
distinction between sheer life and good life that is symmetrical with the division 
between oikos and polis, the private household and the public affairs of the city. 
Conceptualizing sheer life as belonging to the private household, she relates 
them to the realm of necessity, the satisfaction of everyday biological needs of 
human beings. Freedom becomes possible only in the public realm, in the polis. 
Furthermore, freedom of action becomes possible when one is free from 
concerns over biological needs.36 Politics, for Arendt, thus cannot involve con-
cerns for biological aspects of life. The “good life” does not refer in any way to 
biological life; it is ““good” to the extent that by having mastered the necessities 
of sheer life, by being freed from labor and work, and by overcoming the innate 
urge of all living creatures for their own survival, it was no longer bound to the 
biological life process” (Arendt 1998: 37).  
 Arendtʼs understanding of modern society as an enlarged household in 
which sheer life becomes a predominant concern transforms politics into mana-
gement and administration of (biological) necessities. The modern society is, 
consequently, a phenomenon in which creative political action becomes impos-
sible. Instead, human beings are relegated to normalized behavior.37 In the 
summarizing words of Hanna Pitkin (2000: 181), behavior and action are 
distinguished in the following manner: “Behavior is rule-governed, obedient, 
conventional, uniform, and status-oriented; action, by contrast, is spontaneous 
and creative; it involves judging and possibly revising goals, norms, and 
standards rather than accepting them as given. Behavior is routine, action 
unpredictable, even heroic.” By foregrounding behavior, human beings are 
transformed into laboring animals38 whose sole function is to reproduce sheer 
life. Arendtian biopolitics understands subjects to be, then, wholly subjected to 
the normalizing power of society, with the only potentiality for freedom of 
action understood to stem from mastering the necessities of life and relegating 
them from politics altogether. Freedom and biopolitics cannot be, for Arendt, 
thought together. 
 Agambenʼs line of argument is strikingly similar to Arendtʼs. According to 
Claire Blencowe, for example, Agamben shares much more with Arendt than 
with Foucault, whose understanding of biopolitics he is allegedly attempting to 
                                                     
36  “Natural community in the household [...] was born of necessity, and necessity ruled 
over all activities performed in it. The realm of the polis, on the contrary, was the sphere of 
freedom, and if there was a relationship between these two spheres, it was a matter of course 
that the mastering of the necessities of life in the household was the condition for freedom of 
the polis.” (Arendt 1998: 30–31) 
37  “It is decisive that society, on all its levels, excludes the possibility of action, which 
formerly was excluded from the household. Instead, society expects from each of its 
members a certain kind of behavior, imposing innumerable and various rules, all of which 
tend to “normalize” its members, to make them behave, to exclude spontaneous action or 
outstanding achievement.” (Arendt 1998: 40) 
38  “Labor” is distinguished from “work": the latter signifies the act and process of making, 
fabricating some object; the former signifies the simple reproduction of life. 
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complete or correct (see Blencowe 2010). Indeed, Agamben, too, begins his 
Homo Sacer: Bare Life and Sovereignty (1998) with the Aristotelian distinction 
between zoē and bios, life common to all living beings and a politically 
qualified way of life of a certain group of living (human) beings. In addition, his 
argument also involves the observation that biopolitics, first and foremost, 
separates something like a bare life from political life; it produces zoē – life that 
is excluded from politics, but nevertheless included in it as a presupposition of 
bios. This inclusive exclusion of zoē marks, for Agamben, a structure of 
biopolitics which makes it possible to reduce human beings to simple living 
objects, that is, to life that is stripped of all rights and exposed to sovereign 
violence. Just like Arendt, Agambenʼs main concern is to show how the 
inclusion of bare life into politics reduces human beings to a non-human state of 
life, a state that no longer allows any political freedom.  
 In contrast to Arendt, however, Agamben searches for an ahistorical or 
transhistorical structure of biopolitics. Although he does acknowledge that 
“modern democracy presents itself from the beginning as a vindication and 
liberation of zoē, and that it is constantly trying to transform its own bare life 
into a way of life and to find, so to speak, the bios of zoē” (Agamben 1998: 13), 
he nevertheless finds already the Greek division to be biopolitical, allowing for 
the capture of bare life into politics. For Agamben, biopolitics is not so much a 
modern invention, but an ahistorical structure of Western politics as a whole: “It 
can even be said that the production of a biopolitical body is the original 
activity of sovereign power” (Agamben 1998: 11, original italics). This “bio-
political body” is analyzed through the figure of homo sacer – originally a 
concept in Roman Law39 –, someone who is abandoned by the protection of law 
and who can be killed with impunity. With respect to the homo sacer, “all men 
act as sovereigns” (Agamben 1998: 53). The biopolitical body is a body that is 
reduced to bare life and rendered killable. Understanding the whole of Western 
politics as based on the structure of inclusive exclusion, Agamben can conclude 
that its fundamental and originary function is desubjectification and objecti-
fication of human beings through the separation of bare life from political life. 
There are, of course, significant problems with this kind of formal and structural 
conceptualization of politics. In the words of Thomas Lemke (2005), it is, for 
example, simultaneously too general and too narrow in the sense that it effaces 
significant insights into technologies of power and, at the same time, reduces 
politics to one specific structure (see also Coleman and Grove 2008). Katia 
Genel (2006) provides a similar critique, stating that Agambenʼs view reduces 
all of politics to the decision over the value of life.  
 Both Arendt and Agamben underscore the dehumanizing and desubjecti-
fying aspects of biopolitics, stressing that the politicization of life, in fact, 
makes political action – and, consequently, freedom – impossible. For Arendt, 
human beings are normalized and condemned to mere reproductive behavior; 
for Agamben, they are objectified and rendered killable. Both are prone to 
                                                     
39  See on the meaning of homo sacer also Fowler (1911). 
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totalizing visions of power: Arendt “writes about the social as if an evil monster 
from outer space, entirely external to and separate from us, had fallen upon us 
intent on debilitating, absorbing, and ultimately destroying us, gobbling up our 
distinct individuality and turning us into robots that mechanically serve its 
purposes” (Pitkin 2000: 4); Agamben (2016: Part III) tells us that the only way 
to escape the hold of biopolitics is to rethink the concepts of politics and life 
altogether.40 Biopolitics is thus conceptualized by both along the lines of total 
subjection, stripping human beings of the capacity for (self-)construction. Once 
the biological body enters politics, the latter can no longer be conceptualized as 
politics. In this way, both Arendt and Agamben seem to perpetuate the idea that 
“true” politics can only be practiced by and among “minds”, that is, politics has 
to be based on symbolic communication, otherwise it is already perverted into 
an inhuman quasi-politics. 
 Now, the understanding that political freedom of action cannot be thought 
alongside biopolitics, is not limited to Arendt and Agamben, but is present, too, 
in most theorists concerned with emancipatory politics. Alain Badiou, for 
example, in his book Ethics (2001), clearly opposes mere life-as-survival to 
subjectivation according to fidelity to an event (see also Puumeister 2018); 
Jacques Rancière (2010b),41 for his part, has opposed politics to biopolitics, the 
latter being a simple process of control over bodies. Biopolitics is seen as an 
activity of administration, classification, management, control, etc. that has 
nothing to do with freedom of action – biopolitics signifies, for these theorists, 
the “withdrawal” or “retreat” of the political, to use Philippe Lacoue-Labartheʼs 
and Jean-Luc Nancyʼs (1997) phrase.  
 
 
3.2. Biopolitics and freedom 
If biopolitics is seen along the lines of total subjection, the only manner of 
thinking freedom remains that of escape from it altogether. Furthermore, the 
only way of (re)thinking politics appears to lie in the flight from biopolitics. For 
Agamben, who equates Western politics with biopolitics, this task is made all 
the more difficult since political freedom has to take the form of escaping the 
millennia-old tradition of politics as a whole. He does this by getting rid of the 
                                                     
40  Moreover, it is necessary as well to rethink Western ontology, since it is based on the 
same structure of inclusive exclusion of Being as biopolitics is based on the inclusive 
exclusion of life (see especially Agamben 2004; 2016). 
41  When we look at Rancièreʼs own treatment of politics, it is, however, not at all clear that 
biopolitics based on normalization should be excluded from the domain of politics, and 
consequently, of freedom. Rancière understands politics to be precisely that process through 
which the limits of the political community are delineated and, simultaneously, transgressed 
by introducing new political subjects who are recognized as capable of “speech” (see 
Rancière 1995; 2010a). Based on his theory of politics, thus, we have no basis to exclude the 
biological needs and concerns of human beings from politics. Instead, biological aspects of 
lives can always become political when they come to define communities and political 
subjects. 
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notion of subjectivity altogether and searching for an “Ungovernable” “form-of-
life” – a life that cannot be separated from its form (Agamben 2016: 207). 
Inevitably this concept of the “form-of-life” remains obscure and indefinable, 
characterized by such notions as whatever singularity, contemplation, potentia-
lity, inoperativity, destituent power, etc. (Agamben 2000; 2007; 2016). Inevi-
tably, firstly because the “form-of-life” that Agamben wishes to define refers to 
a “coming politics”, to a politics that would enable us to render the Western 
biopolitical structure inoperative. And secondly, because it has to remain 
“ungovernable”, which also means indefinable, unclassifiable, and unidenti-
fiable. Any capture into language would already mean capture into the mecha-
nisms of power (see also Puumeister 2017). 
 While for Agamben, the totalizing and totalized structure of biopolitics 
needs to be countered with an indefinable ungovernable “form-of-life” in order 
to be resisted, Foucault understands resistance to be the primary element of any 
dispositive of power: “[...] resistance comes first, and resistance remains 
superior to the forces of the process; power relations are obliged to change with 
resistance. So I think that resistance is the main word, the key word, in this 
dynamic” (1997: 167, original italics). This also means that there is no under-
lying structure to biopolitics that would define it once and for all. Resistance is 
that through which transformation of dispositives takes place. We are dealing 
with complexes of power/knowledge that constantly need to react to the 
processes of life (see also Mills 2013). Indeed, Foucault himself stated that life, 
when “integrated into techniques that govern and administer it [...] constantly 
escapes them” (1978: 143). 
 We have to ask: how does life escape the capture into dispositives of bio-
power? Agamben (2016: 108) criticizes Foucault for not getting rid of the 
concept of the subject when conceptualizing freedom – since, “if power 
relations necessarily refer to a subject,” the “ungovernable” cannot be thought 
based on this concept. However, it is the inherent ambiguity of subjectivity, the 
duality of subjectivation and subjectification, what enables Foucault to assert 
that resistance comes first. It is evident in Foucaultʼs approach, too, that the 
primary object of biopolitical government is not the individual subject, but 
instead the vital processes that lie beyond the individual – biopolitics targets, 
first and foremost, the population and its processes of life. In the words of 
Katharine Braun, biopolitics “does not really target individuals as living beings. 
It does not primarily operate through exercising direct control over the body or 
through intervening in individual lives. Instead, it targets collective phenomena 
such as the birth rate, or the average life expectancy” (2007: 11, original 
italics). The individual is rendered normalizable on the level of the population, 
since it is there that the “constancy of phenomena that one might expect to be 
variable” is revealed (Foucault 2009: 74). When Foucault speaks of biopolitical 
normalization, he does not speak of individual bodies, but of populations. 
 Thus it might appear as if we can, also in Foucaultʼs approach, discern a type 
of division between bare life and political life, between zoē and bios: the 
individual human being is constituted through his or her reduction to the 
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naturalness discovered on the level of the population. The individual is rendered 
governable on the level of the population. Ultimately, biopolitics targets “man-
as-species” (Foucault 2003c: 242) within which “individual life is just a 
transitory moment” (Braun 2007: 11). For Foucault, however, biopolitics is not 
to be understood as the “withdrawal of politics” or as a quasi-politics hampering 
the creative action of individuals. Instead, he deals with biopolitics as a specific 
political rationality that is based on specific technologies of government. Doing 
this, he avoids the totalizing reasoning of both Arendt and Agamben. “[W]here 
Arendt sees the growth of an anonymous social pressure to conform for the sake 
of ʼlifeʼ, Foucault discerns the gradual consolidation of more or less explicit and 
patterned ʼtechnologies of powerʼ devoted to normalizing individuals” (Dolan 
2005: 373). Where Agamben finds the transhistorical structure of subjection and 
exclusion of bare life, Foucault sees the historically contingent convergence of 
productive biopolitics with deadly sovereign power (Foucault 1978: 149; 2003: 
239–264). 
 Contingency, furthermore, is inscribed into the very logic of biopolitical 
governmentality that Foucault elaborates according to the dispositive of secu-
rity. Biopolitical normalization concerns processes that cannot be wholly fixed 
or permanently pinned down; instead, the phenomena captured within the 
dispositive are processes, that is, they are constantly in movement and thus 
power might always lose control over them: “The specific space of security 
refers [...] to a series of possible events; it refers to the temporal and the 
uncertain, which have to be inserted within a given space.” (Foucault 2009: 20). 
The space in which these uncertain events take place is called by Foucault the 
“milieu”, “a set of natural givens – rivers, marshes, hills – and a set of artificial 
givens – and agglomeration of individuals, houses, etcetera. The milieu is a 
certain number of combined, overall effects bearing on all who live in it” (2009: 
21). Biopolitics, thus, concerns the processes of life of the population in a 
specific milieu – it concerns, in the end, the regulation of the behavior of the 
population and its umwelt. This enables Gordon Hull (2013) to state that bio-
politics is not primarily about life, but about the “management of uncertainty”. 
Now, if the vital processes of the population are themselves “aleatory” and 
prone to error, then the individual lives and behaviors normalized according to 
these processes are nothing short of unpredictable. Foucaultʼs conception of 
biopolitics thus inevitably involves the freedom of individual subjects. And, 
according to Frederick Dolan, this also means that Foucault does not understand 
biopolitics as eliminating political action, but instead “the spread of this mode 
of ʼgovernmentʼ tends to increase opportunities for political action that takes the 
form of questioning, contesting, and resisting the status quo” (Dolan 2005: 
373). This is what Dolan means by the “paradoxical liberty of bio-power”: if the 
human individual is cut up, classified, captured into dispositives in new ways 
involving his or her biological processes and bodily characteristics, this is not 
necessarily a reduction, but simultaneously an opportunity to construct social 
relations along new trajectories. Paul Rabinow (1996), for example, has spoken 
of “biosociality” which accompanies the technologies of biopolitical govern-
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ment and that signifies the ways in which human beings form communities and 
societies based on biological (and often pathological) characteristics (see also 
Gibbon and Novas 2008). 
 Normalization of a population in its milieu, thus, far from reducing human 
lives to bare life, tends to multiply – with each new categorization, with each 
new capture of a dispositive – trajectories along which political action is made 
possible. Although the individual living human being is not the primary object 
of biopolitics, s/he is that through which the processes of the population can be 
accessed – the individual living being is the empirically delimitable point of 
reference for the processes that transcend him or her.42 It is through indivi-
dual(s) that population-level processes can be subjectified, given their “body”, 
so to speak. Conformation to norms of the population is, however, not some-
thing automatic and deterministic; thus, “The other side of normalization, in 
other words, is contestation [...]” (Dolan 2005: 375). This is the reason why, for 
Foucault, it is not necessary to get rid of the concept of the subject. Para-
doxically, the multiplication and proliferation of dispositives that according to 
Agamben reduce subjects to mere “spectral forms” of subjectivity, multiplies, at 
the same time, the lines of resistance – makes it possible for new forms of 
subjectivity to appear. Furthermore, it is along the lines of resistance that 
politics is made possible, because according to Foucault, “nothing is political, 
everything can be politicized, everything may become political. Politics is no 
more or less than that which is born with resistance to governmentality, the first 
uprising, the first confrontation” (cited in Senellart 2009: 390; on this formu-
lation, see also Deuber-Mankowsky 2008). 
 Power is not seen as a totalized machine of subjection, it is the process itself 
of constructing contingent dispositives that are themselves prone to error and 
transformation. The conditions of thinking freedom within the context of 
biopolitical dispositives lies not so much in the capacities of life (that is, that 
which is normalized) – because living beings are inherently capable of choice 
and invention through learning insofar as they are semiotic, or at least 
semiosic43 and thus normative beings –, but in the inherent fragility and 
                                                     
42  In Security, Territory, Population, when Foucault conceptualizes population as the pri-
mary subject-object of biopolitics, he connects it briefly to his analysis, undertaken in The 
Order of Things, of the emergence of the modern human being – “Man” – in nineteenth 
century human sciences: “[...] the theme of man, and the “human sciences” that analyze him 
as a living being, working individual, and speaking subject, should be understood on the 
basis of the emergence of population as the correlate of power and the object of knowledge. 
After all, man, as he is thought and defined by the so-called human sciences of the nine-
teenth century, and as he is reflected in nineteenth century humanism, is nothing other than a 
figure of population” (Foucault 2009: 79). That is, the emergence of biopolitics is the back-
ground on which the figure of “Man” was sketched; it is thus not the reduction of man, but 
the definition of the human being in a new manner as an empirico-transcendental doublet. 
43  On the distinction of the “semiotic” and “semiosic”, see Deely (2005) and Rattasepp, 
Kull (2016): “semiosic” signifies capability for semiosis, while “semiotic” refers to the spe-
cifically human capability of adopting a meta-perspective on meaning-making – the capa-
bility of being aware of using signs.  
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precariousness of biopolitical dispositives themselves. Dispositives cannot be 
totalized – and, consequently, they cannot be reduced to a single underlying 
structure based on which “life itself” would be captured into the mechanisms of 
biopower. 
 
*** 
 
This chapter juxtaposed two perspectives on biopolitics. The first was Agam-
benʼs and Arendtʼs view according to which human lives are reduced to a non-
human state of being of mere survival. The second was the Foucauldian 
perspective according to which biopolitical government, by constructing new 
modes of existence according to which human beings can be made governable, 
simultaneously creates the possibilities to adopt those modes by those governed. 
Biopolitics thus always entails the possibility of resistance and freedom. And 
this is why biopolitics should be seen to operate through semiotic mediation – 
and not as directly intervening in life. Nevertheless, the aim here is not to 
completely disqualify Agambenʼs analysis of the production of bare life in 
biopolitics – the point was simply to underline that it might not be fruitful to 
posit this process as the primary function of biopolitics from which all others 
(such as subjectification) derive. To see how Agambenʼs approach could still 
prove useful, the next chapter will employ it to analyze the biosemiotic concepts 
of the semiotic threshold and umwelt from the biopolitical perspective. 
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4. BIOPOLITICAL ASPECTS OF BIOSEMIOTICS 
 
The aim of this chapter is to problematize a couple of biosemiotic concepts, 
namely those of the semiotic threshold and umwelt. Through this problemati-
zation, the chapter hopes to show the potential biopolitical distinctions and 
hierarchizations at work in biosemiotic theory. The most basic biopolitical 
distinction is, of course, between the human being and “other” forms of life. 
Most importantly to analyses of biopolitics, this distinction allows to form 
hierarchies within the bounds of the human species, marking some humans as 
improper humans. 
 The article “Biopolitics Meets Biosemiotics” (publication IV), co-written 
with Andreas Ventsel, attempted to employ biosemiotic concepts in analyses of 
biopolitics. At the center were the notion of the semiotic threshold and types of 
semiosis as corresponding to distinct levels of meaning-making activity (iconic 
semiosis corresponding to the vegetative level, indexical to the animal, and 
symbolic to the cultural). The article, however, did not consider the opposite 
perspective – what would the analyses of and theoretical approaches to bio-
politics have to offer to how we understand biosemiotics. This chapter aims to 
rectify this omission.  
 Biopolitical analyses almost always involve a critical perspective in at-
tempting to bring to light mechanisms and technologies of power in socio-cultu-
ral processes that are seemingly natural and already self-evident. Biosemiotics 
attempts nothing less than to construe a novel understanding of life – not to 
conceptualize life from the perspective of physico-chemical processes of orga-
nization, but from that of meaning-making and semiosis; life would thus be 
describable as interpretation and communication (see Emmeche and Kull 2011; 
Kull 2008). In Jesper Hoffmeyerʼs and Claus Emmecheʼs words, “the traditional 
paradigm of biology [should] be substituted by a semiotic paradigm the core of 
which is that biological form is understood primarily as sign” (1991: 138, origi-
nal italics). To approach biosemiotics from the critical perspective of biopoli-
tical analysis would mean to ask whether biosemiotics, in its attempt to 
(re)structure the knowledge of life, does not, in fact, participate in some way in 
biopolitical processes of capturing living beings into dispositives of power. This 
question will be explored, firstly, through the investigation of the same concepts 
that were at the center of the article “Biopolitics Meets Biosemiotics”, but in-
verting the direction of analysis and reconsidering the notion of the semiotic 
threshold from the perspective of biopolitics; and secondly, through the 
problematization of Uexküllʼs theory of the umwelt. 
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4.1. The semiotic threshold revisited 
For Giorgio Agamben (2004), one of the fundamental symbolic dispositives of 
biopolitics is the one he names “the anthropological machine” of modernity.44 
This machine operates through isolating, within the human being, the non-
human aspects of life, thus making it possible to animalize45 the human (Agam-
ben 2004: 37; see also Rattasepp 2014). That is, it aims to separate that which is 
truly and properly human (e.g., rationality, language, thought) from that which 
is improper to the human (e.g., passion, desire, instinct, sexuality) and which 
the human shares with other living beings: “Anthropogenesis is what results 
from the caesura and articulation between human and animal. This caesura 
passes first of all within man” (Agamben 2004: 79). The anthropological 
machine defines the human being as the one who is capable of transcending the 
merely animal processes of life. It presupposes that humanity is the exception 
from animality. The anthropological machine does not define life, but articulates 
it into distinct potentialities, characteristics, etc., and in the process positing 
some as superior to others. Insofar as these “lower” processes can be found to 
work also in the human being, it is possible to understand some human beings 
to be not enough human (for example, those who do not govern their passions). 
To discover the properly human is to simultaneously identify those processes 
and characteristics that need to be excluded in order to become a “true” human 
being. 
 Agamben traces the foundations of the anthropological-biopolitical machine 
back to Aristotle whose De anima (2016) he identifies as proposing a first 
generic definition of life as “distinct from the life of the single individual, from 
a life” (Agamben 2016: 201). He calls Aristotleʼs conceptualization of life 
“philosophico-political” (ibid., 195) rather than scientific since it does not, in 
fact, define life, but “limits himself to dividing it thanks to the isolation of the 
nutritive function, in order then to rearticulate it into a series of distinct and 
correlative potentials or faculties (nutrition, sensation, thought)” (ibid., 200). 
The result of this division is a “hierarchical articulation of a series of faculties 
                                                     
44  We have up to now criticized the overly negative and even apocalyptic aspects of Agam-
benʼs view, according to which human beings are, in the context of biopolitics, reduced to 
mere animality and seen as helpless to resist power in any other way than escaping power 
relations entirely. This does not mean that certain aspects of Agambenʼs oeuvre are not 
useful and on point. The notion of the anthropological machine according to which charac-
teristics of life are hierarchized from an anthropocentric point of view allows us to analyze 
the implicit biopolitical aspects in biosemiotic concepts. This does not mean that we should 
revert back to a thoroughly negative understanding of biopolitics. 
45 The term “animalization” is here used not in the sense that human beings are reduced to 
the state of actual animal lives, but that a certain figure of non-human animality is 
constructed as opposing the human being, while nevertheless being operative within the 
human. Animalization refers to the understanding that this supposedly non-human aspect 
(instinct, passion, etc.) becomes to dominate over the human aspect (rationality), thus 
making it possible to view humans as “mere animals”. Thus, it is not a question of any actual 
animality, but of a figure of animality seen as dangerous to a properly human being. 
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and functional oppositions” (ibid.). The nutritive or vegetative function as the 
one common to all living beings – even to plants – is that which needs to be 
overcome in order for the human to become truly human. Agamben calls 
Aristotleʼs articulation of life into functions and properties political since it is 
through the intellectual function, the logos, that the polis – the truly human form 
of association – is founded. Human politics – in which the human being is able 
to recognize itself as human – is founded upon the domination of logos over the 
nutritive, vegetative functions.  
 At first glance, biosemiotics seems to transcend this type of hierarchical 
division. Its manifest aim is to know what life knows (Kull 2009). To concep-
tualize the living process as semiosis means to understand it based on know-
ledge formation. To be a living being means, first and foremost, to interpret 
oneʼs environment (that is, to construct an umwelt) and to communicate with 
other living beings. When biosemiotics posits knowledge as the fundamental 
characteristic of all living beings, it seemingly goes beyond the traditional 
modern opposition between nature and human culture, an opposition where only 
the latter is endowed with meaning-making capacities (see Latour 1993; Des-
cola 2013). Biosemiotics, in endowing all living beings with the capacity for 
knowledge, seems egalitarian in its ambitions. Nevertheless, the concept of the 
semiotic threshold can be read as reintroducing into forms of life a distinction 
between the human being as the most complete and complex living being and 
other living beings as mere precursors to human culture. Furthermore, the 
semiotic threshold makes it possible to locate this distinction within the human 
being itself.  
 While the lower semiotic threshold signifies the difference between life and 
non-life, animate and inanimate nature, the secondary semiotic thresholds 
articulate differences within life. Insofar as life in general is defined on the basis 
of semiosis, the differences need to be understood according to capacities of 
meaning-making. This is commonly done by conceptualizing a certain category 
of living beings through a specific type of sign. Kalevi Kull (2009b) relates 
Charles S. Peirceʼs (1868) notions of iconic, indexical, and symbolic signs to, 
respectively, vegetative, animal, and cultural levels of life.46 These thresholds 
correspond roughly to the old Aristotelian division “between anima vegetativa, 
anima sensitiva, and anima rationale”, as acknowledged by Kull himself 
(2009b: 15). Vegetative life is capable of simple recognition via icons, animal 
life has the capacity of association via indexes, and the human cultural life is 
understood according to the use of symbolic signs, that is, language. While we 
are not dealing here with the traditional nature–culture divide in which only 
cultural living beings (that is, humans) are capable of meaning-making and, 
                                                     
46  An update to the typology of sign relations characteristic of forms of life was made in 
Kull (2017), where the relation of imitation – the respective sign was named the “emon” – 
was added between indexical and symbolic semiosis. The correctness or exhaustiveness of 
the typology is not under scrutiny here, however, and thus it is sufficient simply to mention 
the fact that this typology is not complete, but is continuously being revised. 
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consequently, agency, this articulation of life into levels of semiosis neverthe-
less has the tendency to reconstruct the non-human as the not-yet-human. 
Furthermore, since all three levels of semiosis are operative within the human 
being (vegetative semiosis in the cellular level of the human organism, for 
example), we are perhaps again confronted with the same problem that Agam-
ben identified: how to recognize the truly human within the human being? 
 The division of life according to different sign relations should not, however, 
in itself be read as an indication of a biopolitical function of biosemiotics: to 
understand the different sign relations characteristic to distinct forms of life 
simply opens up the possibility, in the end, to reconstruct the way in which 
living beings signify their world – that is, how they construct their umwelt (Kull 
2009b; 2010; 2017). Conceptualizing certain forms of life, such as single cells, 
according to iconic relations simply capable of constituting a boundary between 
self and non-self means to understand the cell as an active agent of inter-
pretation. The potential biopolitical aspects come into view when the semiotic 
thresholds are combined with concepts that attempt to articulate them into an 
order that almost always refers to the human being as a culmination point. 
 Such is the case for the concept of “semiotic freedom”, introduced by Jesper 
Hoffmeyer and signifying “the increase in richness of “depth” of meaning that 
can be communicated: From pheromones to birdsong and from antibodies to 
Japanese ceremonies of welcome” (1996: 61). “Semiotic freedom”, for Hoff-
meyer, does not simply indicate the “quantitative mass of semiotic processes 
involved,” but the “quality of these processes” (1996: 62). Consequently, the 
qualitative differences between levels of semiosis indicate an increase in 
freedom of choice, in how a living being can possibly respond to “cues” pro-
posed by the environment. When Hoffmeyer writes that “it is quite obvious that 
semiotic complexity or freedom has indeed attained higher levels in later stages, 
advanced species of birds and mammals in general being semiotically much 
more sophisticated than less advanced species” (2010: 196), he seems to 
indicate that evolution is to be conceptualized as a movement towards in-
creasing semiotic freedom.  
 The type of semiosis that provides the most freedom is, of course, the sym-
bolic – characteristic of human language. Terrence Deacon has conceptualized 
the human being in terms of “the symbolic species” in that the human has tran-
scended indexical associations and gained the capacity for symbolic combi-
nation that has enabled humans to construct a “virtual” world of signs not 
confined to the physical one of bodies:  
 
We live in a world that is both entirely physical and virtual at the same time. 
Remarkably, this virtual facet of the world came in to existence relatively re-
cently, as evolutionary time is measured, and it has provided human selves 
with an unprecedented sort of autonomy or freedom to wander from the 
constraints of concrete reference, and a unique power for self-determination 
that derives from this increasingly indirect linkage between symbolic mental 
representation and its grounds of reference. (Deacon 1997: 454) 
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Becoming human means to gain a freedom that is not present in non-human 
animals who are tied to their physical worlds since they can only use indexical 
associations. Both Hoffmeyer and Deacon seem to conceptualize evolution as a 
movement towards becoming-human, and anthropogenesis seems to signify the 
overcoming of or transcending the non-human.  
 This directionality also has the tendency of being transformed into a teleo-
logy, which can be glimpsed in Frederik Stjernfeltʼs understanding of all sign 
types as potentially symbolic, that is, as containing within them the potentiality 
of becoming-a-symbol. Stjernfelt argues that semiotic evolution should not be 
articulated according to the progress from icons via indexes to symbols because 
they are not “mutually exclusive classes” of signs, but rather “form aspects of 
signs and may co-exist in empirical signs” (2012: 40). Based on this recog-
nition, Stjernfelt proposes that we should instead speak of all signs in terms of 
“propositions” – even the simplest icons can express pragmatic truth and can 
thus be understood as “proto-propositions”; when speaking of biology, it is 
justified, for him, to speak of “natural propositions”. He goes so far as to say 
that the highest of Peirceʼs sign types47 – “propositions that form into argu-
ments” – are present “from the beginning of biosemiosis, albeit in a rudimentary 
proto-form” (Stjernfelt 2012: 39). Consequently, even cellular semiosis should 
be conceptualized in terms of a linguistic argument expressing or articulating a 
“truth”. This argument makes for a strange situation in which even a “case as 
simple as E. Coli swimming upstream in a sugar gradient [...] must be described 
as symbolic in Peirceʼs sense [...]” (Stjernfelt 2012: 41–42). Countering the 
articulation of semiosis into types from simplest to more complex, Stjernfelt 
argues, strikingly, that all types of sign activity must be understood according to 
a category of a specifically symbolic nature – the proposition.  
 While the differentiation of sign types into an evolutionary ladder tends to 
reproduce the image of the human being as the highest of animals towards 
whom all others have yet to evolve, the conceptualization of all sign activity 
according to propositions tends to present a very similar picture: all living 
beings, beginning from simple cells, are merely incomplete forms of human 
beings in that they use proto-propositions that have the potentiality to develop 
into proper propositions, or perhaps we should say – properly human propo-
sitions. Thus it appears that biosemiotics, at least in some of its forms, partici-
pates in the anthropological machine that cannot escape the question of what it 
means to be truly human. This recognition makes the employment of biosemio-
tic concepts to critical analyses of biopolitics more complicated than was 
presented in the joint article with Andreas Ventsel, “Biopolitics Meets Bio-
semiotics”. There always remains a danger of dividing the human being into 
separately functioning parts operating according to iconic, indexical, or sym-
bolic semiosis and of locating the properly human dimension solely on the 
symbolic level. Consequently, the biosemiotic vocabulary needs to be employed 
                                                     
47  On arguments or Dicisigns, see CP 2.250–2.253; CP 2.309–2.314. 
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with care in order that it would not reproduce the nature–culture divide that 
makes it possible to animalize the human being.  
 
 
4.2. The ambiguities of umwelt: freedom and plan 
Another crucial biosemiotic concept to be put under scrutiny is that of the 
umwelt. In chapter 2, it was proposed that Foucaultʼs concept of the dispositive 
could be fruitfully complemented by Uexküllʼs umwelt. The result was, on the 
one hand, that the dispositive would not be a simple technical apparatus of 
power, but could be conceptualized as the structuring of the material-semiotic 
umwelt in which the individual can possibly subjectivize him or herself; and on 
the other hand, the umwelt would then have to be rethought not as a space of 
which the subject is the center and creator of all meanings, but as a social space 
traversed by power relations and demanding specific types of subjectivity. That 
is, the umwelt-as-dispositive is not constructed merely by the subjectʼs perspec-
tive, but it has to be understood that that very perspective is constructed through 
semiotic power relations. Nevertheless, employing the concept of umwelt to 
complement the dispositive enabled us to further underscore the active partici-
pation of the subject in the construction of dispositives of power – the subject is 
not to be understood as reduced to a mere object in the biopolitical context, but 
as an agent who (re)constructs the ways of life simultaneously made possible 
and delimited by biopolitical discourses and technologies. The construction of 
subjectivity in the context of biopolitics always presupposes a degree of free-
dom and agency on the part of the subject. 
 It is at this point that we run into a problem. Namely, Uexküll has the 
tendency to underline the non-freedom of the subjects constructing their 
umwelts. This aspect has been underlined by Giorgio Agamben (2004) who 
interprets the concept of umwelt as itself operating as a sort of dispositive of 
biopolitics. Before we move on to Agamben, a few words on Uexküll. He 
resisted the mechanicist perspective on life and living beings (see Brentari 
2015: 47–54), stating, for example, that it would be deceptive to “concede to a 
mechanist, and not a biologist, the right to limit the study of the reality of all 
living organisms to the law of the Conservation of Energy” (Uexküll 1982: 26). 
For him, “Behaviors are not mere movements or tropisms [...]; they are not 
mechanically regulated, but meaningfully organized” (ibid.). Uexküll saw that 
meaning-making is characteristic of all living beings and in this sense his 
theoretical biology is fundamentally egalitarian: all living beings should be seen 
as creators of meaning not reducible to simple mechanical reflexes and re-
actions: “Depending upon its nature, the simplest reflex is a perception–effect 
operation, even if its arc only consists of a chain of individual nerve cells” 
(ibid., 34). His view that even the simplest reflex is of a semiotic nature – it 
presupposes the conferring of meaning upon that which is reacted to – leads him 
to postulate that even the simplest living beings possess an umwelt: “We are 
forced to attribute an Umwelt, however limited, to the free-living fungus-cells, 
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an Umwelt common to each of them, in which bacteria contrast with their su-
rroundings, as meaning-carriers, as food and, in doing so, are perceived and 
acted upon” (ibid., 35). Extended in this manner, meaning-making becomes the 
foundational process of biology. 
 Uexküll describes the umwelt of living beings with the concept of “functio-
nal circle” according to which perception and action are joined in a holistic 
structure of meaning. An object becomes meaningful in such a way that it is 
now possible to act upon this object. It is in this sense that Uexküll speaks of 
“function": “Because every behavior begins by creating a perceptual cue and 
ends by printing an effector cue on the same meaning-carrier, one may speak of 
a functional circle that connects the meaning-carrier with the subject” (1982: 
31). Every behavior is a whole with its internal structure, the parts of which 
have no meaning separately (this is why behaviors cannot be taken apart into 
elements as the mechanist perspective demanded). If a human being sees a dog, 
s/he might pet it, run away from it, or observe it cautiously from a distance; a 
tick, on the other hand, does not even perceive a dog, but only the warmth of a 
mammal that indicates the animalʼs suitability as a food source. There is thus 
not one world common to all living beings, but each has its own carved out 
“soap-bubble” which is not populated by things, but meaning-carrying objects. 
 The functional aspect of the umwelt is the point towards which Agamben 
directs his criticism by essentially saying that Uexküll equates the living being 
with its operation. Agamben interprets Uexküllʼs (1957) famous account of the 
umwelt of the tick as consisting of merely three meaning-carriers: “1) the odor 
of the butyric acid contained in the sweat of all mammals; 2) the temperature of 
thirty-seven degrees corresponding to that of the blood of the mammals; 3) the 
typology of skin characteristic of mammals [...]” (Agamben 2004: 46). Agam-
ben (2004: 47) reads Uexküllʼs delineation of the umwelt of the tick as stating 
that the tick is the relationship between itself and these three elements – the tick 
is reduced to its functioning. Then, however, in Uexküllʼs narrative, a surprising 
twist occurs: he informs us that “in the laboratory in Rostock, a tick was kept 
alive for eighteen years without nourishment, that is, in a condition of absolute 
isolation from its environment” (Agamben 2004: 47). While Uexküll simply 
states that a “tick can wait eighteen years” (1957: 12) for the source of food, 
Agamben remains puzzled; he asks, how can we speak of the subject of an 
umwelt when, in fact, there is no world in which it would be able to assume 
subjectivity: “How is it possible for a living being that consists entirely in its 
relationship with the environment to survive in absolute deprivation of that 
environment?” (2004: 47). 
 For Uexküll, each living being is captured into its umwelt similarly as into an 
Agambenian dispositive and is thus reduced to functioning. There is no escape, 
no freedom in this sense; the only freedom available for the subject of an 
umwelt is to confer (often pre-determined) meanings upon objects. Each species 
is fixed within its specific umwelt that is to a large part carved out by the orga-
nismsʼ Bauplan or building plan which “determines what the living being 
perceives and how it acts, which elements of its perception and activity are 
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constant, and which ones may change in the course of its life” (Pobojewska 
2001: 325). This is, of course, a quite obvious argument to make and it means 
simply to state that it is the physiology of a species that prescribes the manner in 
which it perceives the environment. Uexküll does not exempt human beings 
from these constrictions by saying that “we cannot go beyond the perimeter of 
our Umwelt” (1982: 72). This, again, simply means to state that human beings 
are no Cartesian thinking things but, in their formation of knowledge, are 
always to be conceptualized as embodied beings. 
 However, as Uexküllʼs own writing evidences, the strict restrictions on 
meaning-making by the species-specific umwelt can assume biopolitical dimen-
sions when applied to the understanding of society and culture. Uexküllʼs book 
Biology of the State (1920) outlines a biological theory of state in which the 
latter should be understood along the lines of a literal body or an organism with 
its specific physiology and particular pathologies. Writing in post-World War I 
Germany, the main pathology of the state-body was identified by Uexküll as 
democracy, ineffectively instituted in the Weimar Republic (see Harrington 
1999: 54–56). Indeed, in “On Aristocracy in Science and Politics” (2012 
[1923]), Uexküll specifically calls for an aristocratic, expert government of 
society, stating that democracy, based on popular opinion and the demand for 
equality, should fall under ridicule in a similar way as democratic opinion has in 
science. 
 Uexküllʼs umwelt-theory regards all subjective universes as equally comp-
lete and perfect: “all animals, from the simplest to the most complex, are fitted 
to their unique worlds with equal completeness. A simple world corresponds to 
a simple animal, a well-articulated world to a complex one” (1957: 11). It 
would thus seem that there is no distinction here between inferior and superior 
even on the inter-species level. Nevertheless, Uexküll begins at one point to 
speak about the incompatibility of umwelts in German society and state. In a 
letter to Houston Stewart Chamberlain in 1921, Uexküll writes: “The cohesive 
power of the Jewish Volk is admirable. For that, the Jews are completely 
incapable of building a state. All they produce is just a parasitic net that every-
where corrodes national structures and transforms the Volk into fermenting piles 
of pulp” (cited in Harrington 1999: 60). It thus seems that it is entirely possible 
– and corroborated by Uexküll himself – to divide the human species into 
incompatible umwelts, the conflict of which is up to the biopolitician to resolve. 
 When the biological, species-specific understanding of umwelt and Bauplan 
is extended to politics, it begins, in Uexküllʼs political writings, to assume the 
role of differentiating between groups of humans who can possibly co-exist in a 
shared world. It was, of course, common at the beginning of the twentieth 
century in, for example, political science, social theory and social sciences to 
divide humanity into “races” with specific biological properties that made it 
impossible for different races to form a unified culture. Uexküllʼs understanding 
of umwelt as a closed-off subjective world mapped onto this biopolitical 
division of humanity and called for an aristocratic-monarchical government that 
would keep the differing worlds functional. Groups of human beings were seen 
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48  It must be underlined, however, that Uexküll did not support Hitlerʼs politics of racial 
purification, instead stressing the importance of the value of individual lives (see Brentari 
2015: 38–43). 
in terms of distinct species with their own vital environments. As Agamben 
(2004: 42–43) and Harrington (1999: 68–71) both observe, Uexküllʼs termino-
logy used in the conceptualization of state biology is very close to Nazi eugenic 
politics.48 In such a way, a seemingly neutral and even egalitarian perspective 
on biology can be employed for deadly biopolitical ends. Although Jonathan 
Beever and Morten Tønnessen (2013: 445) contend that perhaps Uexküllʼs 
science and his political and ethical views are not importantly related, their 
relatedness in Uexküllʼs own political writings suggests that the concept of 
umwelt can itself function as a construction block in a biopolitical dispositive. 
Conceptualizing biosemiotics from a biopolitical perspective enables us to 
understand the connections between scientific and ethico-political thought. 
 
*** 
 
Through the problematization of two biosemiotic concepts from the biopolitical 
perspective, at least some of the biopolitical aspects at play in biosemiotics have 
been brought out, although, of course, the analysis is far from complete and 
comprehensive. The primary conclusion being that applying biosemiotic con-
cepts to biopolitical analysis is not as straightforward a task as might have been 
presented in the article “Biopolitics Meets Biosemiotics”. Any attempt at 
ordering and articulating life according to divisions seen as immanent to living 
beings eventually run into the danger of hierarchization, or in other words, 
positing some properties as more relevant and others as subjugated to the 
former. Through the concept of the semiotic threshold, biosemiotics runs the 
risk of reproducing the age-old exceptionality of the human being in the use of 
symbolic signs. The concept of the umwelt has been historically used by 
Uexküll himself in defense of aristocratic politics that poses some ways of life 
as superior to others. The main takeaway here is that biosemiotics can be scruti-
nized through the biopolitical lens; and this means that in future research their 
connections should remain problematic rather than presupposing a unilateral 
movement from science to politics. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
The aim of the introductory part was to conceptualize the connections between 
the critical analysis of biopolitics and semiotics. From the biopolitical perspec-
tive, the introduction (and the thesis in general) focuses on the thought of 
Michel Foucault. This, firstly, for the simple reason that it is from there that all 
the following, multi-faceted, and voluminous discussion of biopolitics springs 
from. It was necessary to return to the source, so to speak, in order to delineate 
more clearly what can be understood under the concept of biopolitics. Fol-
lowing Foucaultʼs proposals, biopolitics can be analyzed through the concepts 
of subjectification–subjectivation, dispositive, and normalization. The second 
reason of the choice to focus on Foucaultʼs work is that his approach is inhe-
rently compatible with a semiotic perspective on social relations and the self-
construction of the subject. By interpreting biopolitics in the context of Fou-
caultʼs more general framework of power, it was shown that biopolitical 
government is always mediated by semiotic activity and does not signify, first 
and foremost, the direct subjugation of life to sovereign power. Instead, bio-
politics is to be interpreted as a form of productive power, productive of social 
subjectivity through normalization. 
 The construction of norms is always a semiotic activity, mediated by signs. 
The construction of “normal” behavior that connects biological processes with 
morality is essentially the production of ways of being, of possible trajectories 
for subjectivation. This is why the Foucauldian approach was set into dialogue 
with Giorgio Agambenʼs and Hannah Arendtʼs understanding of biopolitics, 
both of whom see biopolitics as the reduction of human beings to a mere state 
of survival in which political action becomes impossible. That is, they under-
stand biopolitics as negative, as depriving human beings of their political 
nature. Arendtʼs concept of the social signifies essentially that human beings are 
condemned to reproducing the life of the population, to a laboring behavior that 
strips them of their freedom. Agambenʼs view of the concept of dispositive is 
reductive in the sense that it relies too heavily on techno-determinist thinking, 
reducing human beings to simple cogs in the machine, again condemned to the 
reproduction of apparatuses of power. 
 A more productive view of the concept of dispositive for the analysis of 
biopolitics was put forward by connecting Foucaultʼs understanding of disposi-
tive and Jakob von Uexküllʼs conceptualization of umwelt. It was argued that 
normalization is primarily a regularization of behavior within the populationʼs 
milieu, a structuration of the milieu in which behavior occurs. The concept of 
umwelt helped to stress that this structuration always passes through the 
subjective dimension, it orders the social subjective universe of human beings. 
On the other hand, Uexküllʼs understanding of the subject as the sole giver of 
meanings needed to be decentered and connected to the ways in which, through 
biopolitical management, certain modes of behavior are, through governmental 
practices, strategically given more significance than others. That is, subjecti-
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vation in the social umwelt of human beings always occurs saturated with pre-
existing subjectifications – this means that, through techniques of power/know-
ledge, subjectivity is always-already to a certain degree objectified. 
 This does not mean, however, that the analysis of biopolitics should be 
simply reduced to the review of “objective subjectivities” constructed in 
dispositives of power. This would mean that the dimension of freedom in the 
construction of social subjectivity is forgotten altogether. The ambiguity of the 
subject – as always both an active agent and an always-already objectified 
living being – must be maintained also in the analysis of biopolitics. This means 
that biopolitics should not be considered as a totalized dispositive of power 
encompassing the whole of human behavior. It should be acknowledged that 
within any given society, a multiplicity of dispositives is simultaneously 
operative within agonistic relations to each other. That is, that normalization 
does not occur within a single biopolitical dispositive, but is always local and 
contingent. Freedom in the context of biopolitics is thus not, in the first place, to 
be sought in the agential capacities of “life itself”, but in the contingent nature 
of biopolitical dispositives. 
 The analysis of biopolitics and the dispositives of power led to a problemati-
zation of a couple of biosemiotic concepts. The transfer of concepts from life 
sciences to political analysis always presents a danger as they do not, in them-
selves, carry any political values, but can be used and abused according to the 
strategic ends of a certain politics. That is, they can be used as elements within 
dispositives of power. While not providing any conclusive statements, the 
concepts of the semiotic threshold and umwelt were reconsidered from the 
perspective of biopolitics by asking – do those concepts themselves not parti-
cipate in the biopolitical ordering and articulation of life into hierarchies, which 
enable the division of living beings into improper and proper characteristics of 
life? 
 
*** 
 
The introductory part of the thesis proposed a semiotic perspective on bio-
politics that underlined a twofold necessity. Firstly, it would be necessary to 
examine the whole set of relations operative within certain dispositives, be they 
linguistic or non-linguistic semiotic relations. The articles included in the thesis 
mainly deal with discourse, that is, with linguistic meaning-making. Secondly, 
it would be necessary to investigate resistance in the context of biopolitical 
dispositives. While the articles mostly consider the aspect of subjectification, 
future research should also turn to subjectivation – e.g., through the concept of 
technologies of the self – as a form of resistance. Conceptualizing resistance 
along the lines of subjectivation enables us to think of it not as opposed to 
power relations, but as immanent to power. A twofold perspective for future 
research, then – to examine subjectivation in the context of biopolitical dispo-
sitives in all its semiotic dimensions.  
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OVERVIEW OF ORIGINAL PUBLICATIONS 
 
I Biopolitics, Surveillance, and the Subject of ADHD. The aim of the article 
is to investigate how an individual human being is inserted into the larger social 
order and population through the techniques of biopolitics and surveillance. It 
does this using as an illustration the way in which the subject is constructed in 
relation to Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder. Special attention is paid to 
surveillance and its biopolitical nature. Surveillance techniques can be seen as 
the implementation and realization of biopolitics that are used to create 
knowledge of populations. In relation to ADHD, the main goal of surveillance 
is to ensure treatment adherence. Through this demand, the individual is ex-
pected to subjectivize him or herself as obedient to the norms constructed on the 
level of the population. As such, the subject, while being dependent on the 
norms of the population, is not entirely objectified by the statistical and psycho-
logical norms – by the average “normal” individual –, but is, in fact, expected to 
participate in his or her own normalization whether through medications or 
other forms of therapy. The article is thus an example of the argument that 
biopolitics operates through subjectivation and by making possible certain ways 
of being in a society (see also chapters 1 and 2 of the introductory part). 
 
II Why Does ʻNormalizationʼ Matter to Political Semiotics? The paper 
begins with the observation that the semiotics of power or political semiotics 
has been, so far, confined to discourse analysis concentrating mostly on lin-
guistic expression through which the opposition between self and other is 
constructed. The article argues political semiotics would benefit of an inte-
gration with Michel Foucaultʼs analysis of biopolitical normalization which is 
framed by the concept of the dispositive (dealt with further in chapter 2 of the 
introductory part). This approach would help political semiotics to move be-
yond the analysis of the self/other dichotomy and take into account, also, non-
linguistic modes of signification. Foucaultʼs approach to three general types of 
power and the types of normalization dominant in each of them are mapped out. 
It is Foucaultʼs conviction that normalization in the strict sense – that is, the 
construction of norms that are immanent to vital processes – appears in the bio-
political dispositive of security which differs from sovereign as well as discipli-
nary power. While sovereign power codifies norms into juridical rules and 
disciplinary power imposes external norms onto bodies, the biopolitical 
dispositive of security constructs statistical norms measured from the “natural” 
activity of the population. Normalization in the context of biopolitics thus 
signifies, first and foremost, the construction of norms as “natural” to 
populations and individuals. And the construction of norms as immanent and 
natural to life occurs within the dispositive, a network of heterogeneous 
elements, which goes beyond the constructions of the community through the 
self/other opposition. This is ultimately the reason why the analysis of 
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normalization in dispositives would be complementary to political semiotics, 
showing how the construction of “natural” norms is inherently politicizing. 
 
III Surviving Finitude: Survival as a Constructed Foundation of Identity. 
The article deals with the biopolitical underpinnings of the Estonian national 
identity construction which is analyzed by concentrating on public media 
coverage of, firstly, the Estonian Population and Housing Census 2011, and 
secondly, the passing of the Registered Partnership Act in 2014. The object of 
analysis is the discourse emerging from the statements made about and sur-
rounding these cases. The discourse is called the “discourse of survival”, since 
here the survival of identity appears as the fundamental ground of national 
identity construction. National identity is, in this way, put on the same level 
with “life” – the survival of identity means simultaneously the survival of a 
properly “Estonian” and “traditional” way of life. Survival is not treated in the 
article as the “animal” dimension of human life – that is, as the reduction of 
human life to animality –, but as a mode of sociocultural self-description that 
connects collective identity to biopolitical concerns of population management. 
The constructed need for survival is constructed in the analyzed discourse ac-
cording to the semiotic logic of presentist auto-communication, a logic which 
demands that, in order to persevere, national identity must stay the same (that is, 
“traditional”) throughout historical transformations. Future appears as a simple 
expansion of the present, the latter of which is authenticated by the construction 
of past “traditionality”. In this particular mode of self-description, national 
identity is constructed along the lines of a finite form of life whose sole purpose 
is to resist death. Consequently, the security of (“traditional”) life dominates 
any positive constructions of collective identity, of being together as a collec-
tive. The article presents one possible biopolitical mode of subjectivation 
provided in public political discourse – one, “traditional”, way of becoming an 
Estonian is to constantly concern oneself with oneʼs survival. 
 
IV Biopolitics Meets Biosemiotics: The Semiotic Thresholds of Anti-Aging 
Interventions (co-authored by Andreas Ventsel). The article attempts to argue 
for the relevance of biosemiotic concepts to the analyses of biopolitics. This is 
by no means a straightforward task, since biosemiotics strives to order and 
understand life from a new – semiotic – perspective and biopolitical analysis 
strives to provide a critique of any such orderings (this view is dealt with in 
chapter 4 of the introductory part). Nevertheless, the article shows that the 
concept of the semiotic threshold could provide useful insights in understanding 
biopolitical subjectivity. Adopting a biosemiotic perspective, the latter could no 
longer be conceptualized according to the category of the person but should 
instead be delineated along the lines of an organism within its umwelt. The 
lower semiotic threshold signifies the distinction between the semiotic and the 
non-semiotic, which according to biosemiotics simultaneously signifies the 
distinction between the animate and the inanimate. Semiosis emerges with life. 
The secondary semiotic thresholds mark the border between types of semiosis, 
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ordered from the simplest (iconic) to the most complex (symbolic). While 
political subjectivity has commonly been conceptualized on the symbolic (that 
is, linguistic and human) level, turning our attention to other types of meaning-
making enables us to conceptualize political subjectivity as encompassing 
bodily and vital processes. In addition to the biosemiotic notions of types of 
meaning-making, Georges Canguilhemʼs concept of normativity is employed in 
the article (further discussed in chapter 2 of the introductory part). The politi-
cization of even the simplest meaning-making processes is illustrated through 
an analysis of anti-aging discourse.  
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SUMMARY IN ESTONIAN 
 
Biopoliitilisest subjektsusest:  
Michel Foucaultʼ käsitlus biopoliitikast ning  
selle semiootilised tahud 
Doktoritöö üldiseks eesmärgiks on analüüsida Michel Foucaultʼ käsitlust bio-
poliitikast ning selle võimalikke kokkupuutepunkte semiootikaga. Töö koosneb 
neljast teadusartiklist ning artikleid raamivast osast, mis liigendub omakorda 
neljaks suuremaks peatükiks. Raamiv osa ei ole kirjutatud lihtsa kokkuvõttena 
artiklite argumentidest, vaid seab endale eesmärgiks ka nende edasiarendamise.  
 Termin “biopoliitika” võeti kasutusele 20. sajandi esimese poole organitsist-
likus poliitikateaduses, mil ta viitas eluteaduste olulisusele riigikorralduse ja  
-valitsemise jaoks (Esposito 2008: 16–17; Lemke 2011: 9–10). Elu mõiste ning 
eluteadused seati selleks aluseks, millelt poliitika peaks lähtuma. Ehkki organit-
sistlik perspektiiv riigile ja ühiskonnale on ammu vananenud, ei tähenda see, et 
eluteaduseid ning bioloogilist modelleerimist ei peetaks tänapäevalgi poliitika-
analüüside jaoks oluliseks (vt nt Hatemi ja McDermott 2011).  
 Doktoritöö asetub aga teistsugusesse – kriitilisse – perspektiivi. Selle alga-
tajaks võib pidada prantsuse mõtlejat Michel Foucaultʼd, kes hakkas biopolii-
tikast kõnelema 1970ndate keskel ning kelle järgi tähistab biopoliitika seda 
“mehhanismide kogumit, mille abil muudeti inimliigi bioloogilised omadused 
poliitilise strateegia objektiks” (Foucault 2009: 1). Tema eesmärgiks oli mõista 
seda valitsuslikku loogikat, mille alusel inimese bioloogiline elu rakendatakse 
poliitika teenistusse ning sisestatakse võimusuhetesse. Kriitiline vaatepunkt 
võtab arusaama, et elu ja eluteadused toimivad poliitika ja riigikorralduse 
vundamedina, oma uurimisobjektiks. 
 Olgugi et Foucaultʼ võimukäsitlus on oluliselt mõjutanud nii kultuurilist 
pööret ühiskonnateadustes üldiselt (Nash 2001) kui ka võimusemiootikat (Selg 
ja Ventsel 2008), ei ole semiootikas biopoliitikale erilist tähelepanu osutatud. 
Põhjuseks võib olla asjaolu, et biopoliitilist valitsemist peetakse otseselt kehasse 
ja bioloogilistesse protsessidesse sekkuvaks – mistõttu toimiks see justkui se-
miootilise vahenduseta. Doktoritöö seab sellise vaatepunkti kahtluse alla, 
mõtestades biopoliitikat Foucaultʼ laiema võimukäsitluse raames, mille järgi on 
võimusuhted ühiskondlikes suhetes immanentsed ning toimivad alati vahen-
datuse kaudu.  
 Töö raamiva osa esimene peatükk keskendubki Foucaultʼ üldisema võimu-
käsitluse semiootilistele aspektidele. Foucaultʼ järgi ei allutata inimindiviidid 
sugugi mingile välisele võimule, vaid võim toimib subjektistamise ja subjekti-
vatsiooni kaudu. Võimusuhe ei ole midagi väljaspoolset nt perekondlikest, töö-
alastest, seksuaalsetest suhetest – just neis suhetes endis kehtestatakse subjekti-
positsioonid, kus inimene muudetakse valitsetavaks. Võimusuhetes kehtesta-
takse võimalikud ühiskondlikud olemisviisid, sealhulgas “õiged” viisid olla 
ühiskondlik subjekt. Valitsemine tähistab Foucaultʼ jaoks tegutsemise struktu-
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reerimist võimalike olemisviiside väljal (vt nt 1982). Valitsemine tähendab 
niisiis ka seda, et indiviididelt oodatakse teatud vastust ja valikut, st vabadust – 
indiviid ei subjektiveeru automaatselt selliseks nagu teatud valitsusparadigma 
ette näeb, vaid loob end aktiivselt valitsuslikkuse kontekstis. Võimusuhe on 
seega semiootiline ning eeldab aktiivsust käitumisvälja struktureerituse tingi-
mustes. 
 Teine peatükk liigub edasi otseselt biopoliitika juurde. Siin määratletakse 
biopoliitika ühiskondlikke elamisviise normaliseeriva valitsusviisina. Biopoliiti-
lises valitsemises konstrueeritakse ühiskondlikke suhteid ning indiviidide ja 
kogukondade võimalikke elamisviise normaliseerimise alusel. Valitsemine 
normi alusel viitab juba otseselt vahendatusele ning norm on fundamentaalselt 
semiootiline nähtus, st märgiline konstruktsioon. Tegemist ei ole mitte otsese 
bioloogilistesse protsessidesse sekkumise või vägivallaga, vaid olemisviisi defi-
neerimisega. Normaliseerimise toel ühendatakse ühiskondlik-poliitiline ja “loo-
duslik/loomulik”. Peamise vahendina, mille alusel biopoliitilist normalisatsiooni 
analüüsida,  käsitletakse Foucaultʼ välja pakutud dispositiivi mõistet. Foucaultʼ 
määratleb dispositiivi heterogeensete elementide võrgustikuna, mida raken-
datakse teatud strateegilisel eesmärgil, st mingi (ühiskondlik-poliitilise) prob-
leemi – nt kuritegevus, hullumeelsus, epideemia jne – lahendamiseks (Foucault 
1980b: 194–195; Agamben 2009). Dispositiivi mõistet laiendatakse siin Jakob 
von Uexkülli (1926; 1957[1934]; 1982[1940]) käsitlusega omailmast. Omailm 
kui subjektiivne universum võimaldab rõhutada biopoliitika subjektiivset 
aspekti – st biopoliitiline valitsemine mitte otseselt elule mõjuvana ning elu 
mõjutavana, vaid subjekti maailma konstrueerivana, seda normide loomise kau-
du. Kui aga, vastupidi, vaadata omailma käsitlust dispositiivi mõiste perspek-
tiivist, oleme sunnitud tunnistama, et subjekt ei saa enam olla tähenduste alus ja 
alguspunkt, vaid alati juba võimusuhetesse ning juba tähendustatud-struktu-
reeritud maailma sisestatud tegutseja. Omailma mõiste võimaldab mõtestada 
subjektivatsiooni (kuidas subjekt end aktiivselt konstrueerib), samas kui dis-
positiivi mõiste võimaldab näha, et subjekt peab seda tegema juba alati sub-
jektistatult, st suhestuma ja vastama juba olemasolevatele normaliseeritud ja 
normaliseeritavatele subjektipositsioonidele, mis on konstitueeritud võimusuhe-
tes. Omailma-käsitlusele annab lisamõõtme Georges Canguilhemi normatiiv-
suse mõiste, mille abil on võimalik mõista, et elusolend säilitab ka normali-
seeritud keskkonnas võime “eksida”, st oma käitumist ja tähenduslikku maailma 
muuta. 
 Kolmas peatükk heidab pilgu nägemusele biopoliitikast kui vabadust ja 
valikut hävitavast valitsusviisist. Hannah Arendt (1998[1958]) käsitleb elu sise-
nemist poliitikasse inimese täieliku normaliseerimisena, milles inimindiviid 
taandatakse seisundile, milles poliitiline tegutsemisvabadus (mõtestatud Aristo-
telese põhjal) ei ole enam võimalik ning alles on jäänud kõigest enese elu käitu-
muslik taastootmine. Arendt vastandab poliitika – tegutsemisvabadust võimal-
dav suhtevorm – sotsiaalsusele kui pelgalt bioloogilisele vajadusele suunatud 
käitumisviisile. Kui bioloogia või kehalisus poliitikasse siseneb, ei ole vabadus 
enam võimalik. Giorgio Agambenile (1998; 2005; 2016) on omane sarnane 
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seisukoht, nimelt et poliitiline vabadus ei ole biopoliitikas võimalik. Arendtile 
vastupidiselt mõtestab Agamben biopoliitilist võimu täieliku erandi terminites. 
Inimene on biopoliitilise valitsemise kontekstis alati paljastatud suveräänse 
võimu surmavale vägivallale. See tähendab, et oluline ei ole mitte norm ja 
normaliseeritus, vaid suverääni võime erandkorras igal hetkel inimelu väärtuse 
üle otsustada. Nii Arendt kui Agamben mõistavad biopoliitikat justkui totaalse 
võimuna, millele on võimalik vastu panna vaid sellest täielikult välja astudes. 
Peatükis argumenteeritakse, et Foucaultʼ vaatepunkt, mis seab esikohale vastu-
panu dispositiivi kontekstis, on semiootilise analüüsi perspektiivist viljakam, 
kuna võimaldab meil ka keskenduda spetsiifilistele võimu- ning eneseloome-
tehnikatele kui vähemalt teatud määral vabadust eeldavatele praktikatele – 
lõppkokkuvõttes seega ka semiootilist vahendust eeldavatele praktikatele. 
Biopoliitikat ei tohiks käsitleda totaalse võimuna, mis võtab elu täielikult enese 
haardesse ning millest ei ole seega väljapääsu.  
 Kui eelnevalt katsuti mõtestada seda, kuidas biopoliitikat semiootiliselt 
mõistetavaks ja analüüsitavaks teha, siis raamiva osa neljas ja viimane peatükk 
võtab vaatluse alla kaks biosemiootilist mõistet ning analüüsib neid kriitilise 
biopoliitika-analüüsi vaatepunktist. Nendeks kaheks mõisteks on semiootiline 
lävi ning omailm. Mõlema kohta küsitakse: kas nad mitte ei osale potent-
siaalselt biopoliitises diskursuses, mis eeldab eluviiside ja -vormide teatavasse 
hierarhiasse asetamist, mille kõrgeimaks astmeks seatakse enamjaolt inimene. 
Enamgi veel, tihti osutub, et sellise hierarhia kehtestamine võimaldab inimese ja 
inimliigi siseseltki kehtestada liikumise madalamast kõrgema eluvormini, mis 
viib selleni, et inimest on võimalik taandada n-ö madalamate protsesside (meta-
bolismi, geneetika, kirgede jne) “orjaks” – st lõppeks, mitte-päris-ratsionaalseks 
inimeseks. Analüüsides biosemiootilisi mõisteid biopoliitika vaatepunktist, saa-
me paremini mõista neid ohte, mis kaasnevad eluteaduste mõistete rakenda-
misega poliitiliste protsesside analüüsis. 
 Töö raamiv osa keskendub seega biopoliitika ja semiootika võimalikele 
kokkupuutepunktidele kahesuunaliselt. Esiteks, kuidas mõtestada biopoliitikat 
semiootilisest vaatepunktist. Teiseks, kuidas võiks kriitiline analüüs biopoliiti-
kast olla kasulik semiootiliste mõistete võimalike poliitiliste aspektide mõtes-
tamisel. Lisaks käsitleb see üldteoreetilisemalt artiklites kasutatud lähenemisi ja 
mõisteid. Järgnevalt esitan lühikese kokkuvõtte doktoritöösse kaasatud artik-
litest. 
 I artikkel “Biopoliitika, järelevalve ning aktiivsus- ja tähelepanuhäire 
subjekt” (Biopolitics, Surveillance, and the Subject of ADHD) uurib seda, kui-
das inimindiviid sisestatakse laiemasse sotsiaalse korra ja populatsiooni kon-
teksti biopoliitiliste järelevalvetehnikate alusel. Näitena kasutatakse neid viise, 
kuidas käib subjekti konstrueerimine suhestatuna aktiivsus- ja tähelepanuhäire-
ga. Suurema tähelepanu all on järelevalve ning selle biopoliitilised aspektid. 
Järelevalvetehnikaid võib mõista populatsiooni kohta teadmist konstrueeriva 
biopoliitika rakendusena. Aktiivsus- ja tähelepanuhäire puhul on järelevalve 
peamiseks eesmärgiks kindlustada, et inimesed ettekirjutatud ravist kinni peak-
sid. Selle nõudmise alusel peab inimene end subjektiveerima kuulekana 
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populatsiooni-tasandi normidele. Subjekt ei saa siin aga täielikult objektivee-
ritud, vaid peab end looma statistiliste ja psühholoogiliste normide alusel – ta 
peab end aktiivselt normaliseerima. Artikkel on seega näide sellest, kuidas bio-
poliitika toimib subjektivatsiooni teel, tehes nähtavaks ja vajalikuks teatud 
ühiskondlikud olemisviisid (vt ka raamiva osa teine peatükk). 
 II artikkel “Miks on ʻnormalisatsioonʼ poliitilisele semiootikale olu-
line?” (Why Does ʻNormalizationʼ Matter to Political Semiotics?) algab tõde-
musega, et nii võimusemiootika kui ka poliitiline semiootika on siiani piirdunud 
diskursuseanalüüsiga, mis keskendub “oma” ja “võõrast” eristavate keeleliste 
lausungite uurimisele. Artikli eesmärgiks on näidata, et poliitilisele semiooti-
kale tuleks kasuks Michel Foucaultʼ biopoliitilise normalisatsiooni käsitluse 
kasutamine, käsitluse, mille põhimõisteks on dispositiiv (vt ka teine peatükk töö 
raamivast osast). See lähenemine võimaldaks poliitilisel semiootikal minna 
kaugemale oma/võõra piiride kehtestamise analüüsist – samuti tuleks arvestada 
ka mitte-keelelisi tähenduslaade. Normalisatsioon tähistab biopoliitilises kon-
tekstis esmajoones populatsioonidele “loomulike” normide konstrueerimist. 
Normide konstrueerimine elu(viiside)le immanentse ja loomulikuna toimib 
dispositiivi, hetegoreensete elementide võrgustiku, kontekstis. Mis tähendab, et 
tegemist ei ole kõigest keeleliste konstruktsioonidega. Seega, näidates, et 
“loomulike” normide konstrueerimine on poliitiline tegevus, oleks normalisat-
siooni mõiste poliitilisele semiootika oluline. Eluviiside mõtestamine normide 
alusel tähendab nende poliitikasse sisestamist. 
 III artikkel “Lõplikkuse ületamine: ellujäämine identiteedi konstruee-
ritud alusena” (Surviving Finitude: Survival as a Constructed Foundation of 
Identity) tegeleb Eesti rahvusliku identiteedi loome biopoliitiliste aspektidega. 
Seda analüüsitakse kahe juhtumi meediakajastuse alusel: 1) 2011. rahvaloendus 
ja 2) kooseluseaduse vastuvõtmine 2014. aastal. Täpsemalt analüüsitakse ava-
likku diskursust, mis nende juhtumite kohta käib. Neist avalikest sõnavõttudest 
koorub välja teatud “ellujäämise diskursus”, mis asetab identiteedi ellujäämise 
kesksele kohale ning seab selle tähtsamaks igasugusest positiivsest nägemusest, 
milline see identiteet õigupoolest olema peaks. Identiteet ja “elu” hakkavad siin 
samastuma: kui jääb ellu identiteet, püsib hinges ka rahvas. Ellujäämist ei 
käsitleta siin lihtsa “loomaliku” inimelu mõõtmena – st kui inimelu taandamist 
loomalikkusele –, vaid ühe võimaliku sotsiokultuurilise enesekirjeldusviisina, 
mis ühendab kollektiivse identiteedi biopoliitiliste, populatsiooni valitsemise, 
eesmärkidega. Konstrueeritud ellujäämisvajadus kehtestatakse analüüsitud dis-
kursuses presentistliku auto-kommunikatsiooni loogika alusel. See loogika 
nõuab, et jätkumiseks peab rahvuslik identiteet püsima läbi aja(loo) samana. See 
tähendab ka, et tulevikku mõtestatakse lihtsalt oleviku jätkuna. Olevik aga 
viitab pidevalt “traditsioonilistele” eluviisidele, mis konstrueeritakse oleviku-
lisest vaatepunktist otsekui eestlusele loomulikuna – ka minevik on kõigest 
oleviku pikendus. Rahvuslik identiteet konstrueeritakse lõpliku eluvormina, 
mille esmaseks eesmärgiks on surma vältimine. Ellujäämine on tähtsam kui 
identiteedi positiivsed konstruktsioonid. Artikkel esitab ühe võimaliku biopolii-
tilise subjektivatsiooniviisi, mis kehtestatakse avalikus diskursuses – “tradit-
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siooniline” viis saada eestlaseks tähendab pidevalt muretseda oma ellujäämise 
pärast. 
 IV artikkel “Biopoliitika kohtub biosemiootikaga: vananemisvastane 
diskursus ja semiootilised läved” (Biopolitics Meets Biosemiotics: The Se-
miotic Threshold(s) of Anti-Aging Interventions, kaasautor Andreas Ventsel) 
küsib, kuidas oleks biosemiootilisi mõisteid võimalik kasutada biopoliitilistes 
analüüsides. Tegemist ei ole sugugi sirgjoonelise ettevõtmisega, kuna bio-
semiootika eesmärgiks pole ei rohkemat ega vähemat kui elust uue – semioo-
tilise – arusaamise loomine, samas kui biopoliitika analüüsid tegelevad enam-
jaolt just taoliste katsete kriitikaga. Sellegipoolest argumenteerib artikkel, et 
semiootilise läve mõiste võiks olla kasulik biopoliitilise subjektsuse mõist-
misele. Omandades biosemiootilise perspektiivi, ei saa subjektsust enam mõista 
isiku paradigmast lähtudes, vaid peaks olema mõistetud elusolendina oma 
spetsiifilise omailmaga. Ehkki poliitilist subjektsust on enamjaolt mõtestatud 
sümbolilise semioosi tasandil, st keeleliselt ja inimlikult, saaksime nii ikoonilise 
kui ka indeksiaalse semioosi käsitlemise abil poliitilise subjektsuse mõistesse 
haarata ka kehalised ja bioloogilised protsessid. See tähendaks kogu organismi 
normatiivsuse Georges Canguilhemi mõistes (vt ka teine peatükk raamivast 
osast) kaasamist. Eri tasandite tähendusloomeprotsesside politiseerimist illust-
reeritakse vananemisvastase diskursuse näitel. 
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